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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm.”1 
 
Presidents cancel or modify executive orders and proclamations 
issued by prior Presidents all the time.2 What is not so clear is whether 
this presidential discretion applies to orders or proclamations issued at 
                                                          
*Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center where she teaches natural 
resources law among other courses and directs an environmental law clinic. She 
thanks the Law Center for its continuing generous support for her scholarship, 
without which this article might not have been possible and for the ongoing 
technical, proofreading, and moral support from her clinic’s office manager, Niko 
Perazich. 
1 THE FEDERALIST No.10, at 57 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961). 
2 For example, on March 27, 2017, President Trump issued an Executive Order 
titled “Revocation of Federal Contracting Executive Orders” rescinding the 
Executive Orders issued by President Obama (Exec. Order No. 13,673 of July 31, 
2014, Exec. Order No. 13,738 of August 23, 2016, and Exec. Order 13,683, § 3, of 
December 11, 2014). Exec. Order No. 13,782, 82 Fed. Reg. 15,607 (Mary 27, 
2017). 
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the direction of Congress, as is the case with national monuments 
designated by presidential proclamation under the authority of the 
Antiquities Act.3 Section 431 of that Act authorizes the President to 
declare by public proclamation “historic landmarks, historic and 
prehistoric structures and other object of historic or scientific interest” 
on public land and to reserve sufficient public land to properly care for 
and manage the protected objects.4 While over the law’s 111 years, 
disgruntled states, interest groups, and individuals have challenged some 
of these proclamations, no President has ever rescinded a designation 
made by a prior President, let alone even threatened it, until President 
Trump proposed doing so this year.5  
This Article suggest that the fact that Congress has placed its 
imprimatur on the designation process shields it from whimsical actions 
by later Presidents seeking to rescind or shrink the size of previously 
designated national monuments.6 To conclude otherwise would 
                                                          
3 54 U.S.C. § 320301 (2014). See Roberto Iraola, Proclamations, National 
Monuments, and the Scope of Judicial Review Under the Antiquities Act of 1906, 
29 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 159, 164-65 (2004) (“Whether the 
President may modify the size of a monument remains more of an open question in 
academic circles.”). 
4 54 U.S.C. § 320301 (2014). 
5 President Trump issued an executive order, “Review of Designations under the 
Antiquities Act,” directing the Secretary of Interior to review monument 
designations made since 1996 that reserve over 100,000 acres “where the Secretary 
determines that the designation or expansion was made without adequate public 
outreach and coordination with relevant stakeholders.” Exec. Order No. 13,792, 82 
Fed. Reg. 20, 429 (Apr. 26, 2017). The Secretary is to write a report making 
recommendations for Presidential action, legislative proposals, or other action 
consistent with law as the Secretary may consider appropriate to carry out the 
policy” set out in the order. Mark Squillace, Eric Biber, Nicholas S. Bryner, Sean 
B. Hecht, Presidents Lack the Authority to Abolish or Diminish National 
Monuments, 103 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 55, 55 n.2 (June 2017), 
http://www.virginialawreview.org/volumes/content/presidents-lack-authority-
abolish-or-diminish-national-monuments. See Jennifer Yachnin, Zinke could target 
any site he deems lacked ‘outreach,’ E&E NEWS (Apr. 26, 2017), 
http://eenews.net/eenewspm/stories/1060053645/print (listing twenty-four national 
monuments under review by Secretary Zinke). 
6 Although some prior Presidents, especially during the early period of the Act’s 
implementation, reduced the size of previously designated monuments, including 
some large reductions like President Wilson halving the size of Mount Olympus 
National Monument established by President Teddy Roosevelt, these actions have 
never been reviewed by a court, let alone had their validity determined by a court. 
Additionally, all these actions occurred before the enactment of section 704(j) of 
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contradict the plain language of the statute, which would give Congress 
plenary power over the designation process and would aggregate to the 
President powers he does not have, thus creating separation of powers 
concerns. Nor can Presidents simply elect not to enforce a law because it 
is not to their liking. Allowing Presidents to revoke prior monument 
designations would create substantial uncertainty about the legal force 
and effects of such proclamations once made. This uncertainty, in turn, 
would affect expectations about how the designated land should be 
managed and inhibit future designations. It would also adversely affect 
local economic growth and regional adjustments in response to 
designations. 
The article develops these observations in the following manner. 
Part II briefly sets out the legislative and judicial history of the 
Antiquities Act, its original purpose, its use over the years, and judicial 
decisions interpreting its text. This part also discusses prior attempts by 
Presidents to revoke or modify earlier designations. Part III 
contextualizes the current debate over the statute by examining the local 
controversy surrounding President Obama’s designation of the Bears 
Ears National Monument in Utah. Part III tries to understand whether 
the animosity towards national monuments, as exemplified by the 
opposition to Bears Ears designation and before that to President 
Clinton’s designation of the Grand Staircase-Escalante National 
Monument, is the last vestige of strong anti-federal government feelings 
in the Intermountain West.7 Such feelings may be weakening as the 
                                                                                                                                       
the Federal Land Policy & Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1714(j), preventing the 
Secretary of Interior from modifying or revoking any reservation of land creating a 
national monument under the Antiquities Act. See Squillace et al., supra note 5, at 
65. Presidents Taft and Eisenhower also reduced the boundaries of pre-existing 
monument and President Wilson added 900,000 acres to the system. Juliet Elperin, 
Trump to ask for review of national monuments, WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 25, 
2017, at A3; see also Squillace et al, supra note 5, at 66-68 (discussing, more 
generally, the lack of Presidential authority to shrink national monuments, 
including various Solicitor Opinions issued by the Solicitor of the Department of 
the Interior in 1924, 1932, and 1935 on the topic of the President’s lack of authority 
to do so). 
7 That these anti-government sentiments are not only a western phenomenon is 
brought home by local opposition to President Obama’s 2016 designation of 
Katahdin Woods and Waters National Monument (North Woods National 
Monument) in Maine, protecting 87,500 acres. Governor Paul LePage testified 
before the House Natural Resources Committee against the designation in April 
2017 and has asked President Trump to reverse the order creating the monument, 
saying that the designation will “undermine the forest products industry by limiting 
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area’s population changes from one that engages in traditional western 
industries, like ranching and mining, to one that relies on recreation and 
tourism.  
Part III also sets out three over-arching criticisms of the statute, 
which have become manifest during the recent debates over the 
designation of Bear Ears National Monument in, namely that (1) the Act 
usurps congressional power, (2) the Act is undemocratic because neither 
the public nor any popularly elected legislator participates in the 
designation process, and (3) designations under the Act adversely affect 
the cultural salience and economic well-being of local communities. The 
Part includes a rejoinder to each of those arguments, including the 
results of recent reports showing that monument designations create 
positive economic and social impacts on host communities. 
Part IV argues that Presidents have neither direct nor implied power 
to rescind or adjust the boundaries of previously designated national 
monuments. The part shows that the text of the Act unambiguously 
prohibits the President from changing in any way a prior President’s 
designation of a national monument, reserving that power to Congress. 
Interpretive canons and other explanatory tropes are either irrelevant or 
confirm a limited view of the President’s authority. Part V show how 
any contrary view of the President’s authority under the Antiquities Act 
would violate the separation of powers doctrine and run counter to well-
established norms governing the exercise of delegated power by 
Presidents. While Presidents retain some discretion to tinker with laws 
that require minor adjustments to respond to changed circumstances, 
Part V shows how the Take Care Clause prohibits a President from 
categorically waiving provisions of a law he does not like or with whose 
underlying policy he disagrees. 
The article concludes by observing that allowing a President to 
revoke or alter the boundaries of a designated national monument, as 
President Trump is proposing to do with Bears Ears and several other 
monuments, would undermine the purpose of a 111-year old law and 
abolish an act of Congress by Presidential fiat. It may also invite public 
anger and reprisal, especially if the action is perceived as illegitimate.  
II. THE TEXT OF THE ANTIQUITIES ACT, ITS LEGISLATIVE AND 
                                                                                                                                       
timber harvest.” Maine Governor to testify against Katahdin Woods designation, 
GREENWIRE (April 25, 2017), 
http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060053544/print. Maine’s congressional 
delegation supports the designation. Id. 
CONVERTDOC.INPUT.593072.DSQ9K (DO NOT DELETE) 1/17/2018  10:44 PM 
106 STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:1 
 
IMPLEMENTATION HISTORY, AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS 
In the realm of historic and natural preservation on the nation’s 
public lands, no law has ever approached the scope of the 1906 
Antiquities Act.8  
Section 431 of the Antiquities Act authorizes the President of the 
United States to protect by proclamation “historic landmarks, historic 
and prehistoric structures and other objects of historic or scientific 
interest” located on federal lands. The section also authorizes the 
President to reserve “parcels of land” of a size sufficient to allow for the 
proper care and management of the protected objects. Originally 
intended to protect ruins in the Southwest, Presidents have used the 
section to protect large areas of land, in which objects of historical and 
scientific interest are housed—so-called landscape designations. Today 
there are 170 national monuments, thirteen of which have been 
designated by Congress, including monuments that protect marine 
resources.9 They range in size from 1,700,000 acres (Grand Staircase-
Escalante National Monument in Arizona) to 0.01 acres (Father Millett 
Cross in New York).10 Only three Presidents since the passage of the 
Act in 1906, Presidents Nixon, Reagan, and George H.W. Bush did not 
designate any monuments.11  
Devils Tower, in Wyoming, is “America’s first national 
                                                          
8 Richard West Sellars, A Very Large Array: Early Federal Historic Preservation -
The Antiquities Act, Mesa Verde, and the National Park Service Act, 47 NAT. 
RESOURCES. J. 267, 293 (2007). See also John D. Leshy & Mark Squillace, The 
Endangered Antiquities Act, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2017, at A23 (“a good argument 
can be made that this brief law . . . has done more than any other to shape our 
nation’s conservation legacy.”); see also id. (“Five of the nation’s 10 most-visited 
national parks—Grand Canyon, Zion, Olympic, Teton, and Acadia, each attracting 
millions of people a year—were first protected by presidents using the Antiquities 
Act.”).  
9 Tatiana Schlossberg, What is the Antiquities Act, and Why Does the President 
Want to Change It, N.Y. TIMES, Ap. 27, 2017, at A15. See Matthew J. Sanders, Are 
National Monuments the Right Way to Manage Federal Public Lands?, 31 NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENVT. 3, 4 (2017) (saying there are 147 national monuments); Leshy 
& Squillace, supra note 8, at A23 (pegging the number at 150). 
10 Sanjay Ranchod, The Clinton National Monuments: Protecting Ecosystems with 
the Antiquities Act, 25 HARV. ENVT’L L. REV. app. A at 585-87 (2001). President 
Coolidge who established the Father Millet Cross National Monument, also 
designated the Statue of Liberty, protecting 2.50 acres; he was capable of creating 
large monuments, setting aside 1,164,800 acres for Glacier Bay National 
Monument in Alaska. Id. 
11 Elperin, supra note 6, at A3. 
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monument.12 Currently, there are national monuments in thirty-one 
states.13 “The number of national monuments designated by each 
President has varied wildly, from one each for Presidents Truman and 
Johnson to nineteen each for Presidents Clinton and Obama.”14 Of land-
based national monuments, President Carter designated the largest 
combined area, nearly 56 million acres, mostly in Alaska. President 
George W. Bush designated more than 147 million acres of marine 
national monuments. President Obama surpassed both Presidents Bush 
and Clinton by protecting 265 million acres, mostly by enlarging 
President Bush’s network of marine national monuments.15 The last 
three Presidents have designated nearly a third of the national 
monuments created up until the present, “and they are responsible for an 
even higher percentage of the total number of acres included within 
national monuments over time.”16 Only Presidents Nixon, Reagan, and 
George H.W. Bush failed to use their power under the Antiquities Act to 
designate any national monument.17 
Most of this has happened by Presidential fiat, often late in their 
Administrations with little correction by the courts or Congress.18 The 
section’s legislative history is sparse and sheds little light on key terms, 
like what constitutes an object of historic or scientific interest or what is 
“the smallest area” that a President may reserve to assure the proper care 
and management of the designated objects.19 Attempts by Presidents and 
Congress to revoke or modify previously designated monuments have 
come to naught, creating an inference that at least up until now, the Act 
has been working as it was intended to. 
                                                          
12 Sellars, supra note 8, at 294; see also Arnold & Porter, Kaye Scholer, The 
President Has No Power Unilaterally to Abolish a National Monument under the 
Antiquities Act of 1906 (Feb. 8, 2017), 2 (in possession of author) (“President 
Theodore Roosevelt was the first to use that Act, establishing 18 National 
Monuments, including Devil’s Tower, Muir Woods and the Grand Canyon.”).  
13 Arnold & Porter, supra note 12, at 9. 
14 Id. at 4. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Elperin, supra note 6, at A3; see also Albert Lin, Clinton’s National Monuments: 
A Democrat’s Undemocratic Acts?, 29 ECOLOGY L. Q 707, 714 (2002), but he 
mistakenly says President George W. Bush did not designate any monuments. 
18 Leshy & Squillace, supra note 8, at A23 (citing President Theodore Roosevelt’s 
protection of the “core” of what today is Olympic National Park two days before he 
left office or President Eisenhower’s protection of what became the Chesapeake 
and Ohio National Historical Park two days before Kennedy’s inauguration).  
19 See infra at Part II.B (discussing the statute’s legislative history). 
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A. The Antiquities Act and the process for designating a National 
Monument. 
Section 431 of the Antiquities Act reads as follows: 
 
The President of the United States is authorized, in his discretion, to 
declare by public proclamation historic landmarks, historic and 
prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest 
that are situated upon the lands owned or controlled by the 
Government of the United States to be national monuments, and may 
reserve as a part thereof parcels of land, the limits of which in all cases 
shall be confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper care 
and management of the objects to be protected. When such objects are 
situated upon a tract covered a bona fide unperfected claim or held in 
private ownership, the tract, or so much thereof as may be necessary 
for the proper care and management of the object, may be relinquished 
to the Government, and the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to 
accept the relinquishment of such tracts in behalf of the Government of 
the United States.20  
 
In 155 words, section 431 of the Antiquities Act sets out a process 
for the President of the United States to identify and protect “historic 
and prehistoric structures and other objects of historic or scientific 
interest” on federal lands and simultaneously reserve sufficient lands for 
their “proper care and management.”  
This is not done by executive order, the usual tool that the President 
uses to announce some policy or action, but by proclamation.21 
However, that the President proceeds by proclamation rather than 
executive order to designate national monuments has no relevance to the 
question whether the President has the power to rescind or otherwise 
amend a monument designation.22 But, the fact that presidential 
proclamations designating national monuments are issued under the 
authority of the Antiquities Act gives them more than the usual hortatory 
                                                          
20 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2000). 
21 STAFF OF H. COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS, 85TH CONG., EXECUTIVE ORDERS 
AND PROCLAMATIONS: A STUDY OF USE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS, at vii (Comm. 
Print 1957).  
22 PAMELA BALDWIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20647, AUTHORITY OF A 
PRESIDENT TO MODIFY OR ELIMINATE A NATIONAL MONUMENT, at 1 n.7 (2000) 
(One congressional study noted that executive orders relate to intra-executive 
branch actions, while “a proclamation typically affects citizens” more broadly.). 
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power with respect to the general public.23 
There is no requirement for public notice of any designation either 
before or after the fact, and no opportunity for comment or any other 
form of participation by the public or its elected representatives in the 
designation process.24 While the statute “authorizes” the President to set 
aside land, it does not “require” that he do this.25 But once the land is 
reserved, the designated monument becomes the dominant use of that 
land in the face of competing land uses, and the land management 
agencies must manage “the objects” and reserved lands as necessary to 
fulfill the purposes of the designation proclamation.26 
Site examination and excavation on monument grounds as well as 
removal and collection of objects is controlled through a permitting 
system that restricts these activities to qualified representatives of 
museums, universities or other recognized educational institutions, 
where the removed objects are to be permanently curated.27 The Act 
criminalizes disturbing protected sites without a permit and imposes 
fines and penalties on those who violate the law.28  
The Department of Interior, or occasionally the Department of 
Agriculture if the future monument is on national forest lands, generates 
a proposal to create a new national monument, sometimes at the 
suggestion of a grassroots coalition, sometimes at the suggestion of a 
                                                          
23 PAMELA BALDWIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20647, AUTHORITY OF A 
PRESIDENT TO MODIFY OR ELIMINATE A NATIONAL MONUMENT, at 1 n.7 (2000) 
(“the President's proclamations are at best hortatory so far as the general public is 
concerned unless they are based on statutory or Constitutional authority."), citing 
Executive Orders and Proclamations: A Study of a Use of Presidential Powers, 
Committee on Government Operations, 85th Congress, 1st Sess. at vii (Dec. 
1957).”). 
24 Iraola, supra note 3, at 163 (“The plain language of the Act confers upon the 
President the authority to designate national monuments without public 
participation, congressional review, or any other procedural prerequisite.”); see also 
David H. Getches, Managing the Public Lands: The Authority of the Executive to 
Withdraw Lands, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 279, 300 (1982) ("The Antiquities Act 
gave the President authority to withdraw lands with no limits on duration, 
unhindered by any procedural requirements, with no provision for congressional 
review, and with no fixed acreage limitation."). 
25 Mark Squillace, The Monumental Legacy of the Antiquities Act of 1906, 37 GA. 
L. REV. 473, 514 (2003). 
26 Id. at 515-16. 
27 16 U.S.C. § 433 (1906); see Sellars, supra note 8, at 294. 
28 16 U.S.C. Preamble (1906); see Sellars, supra note 8, at 294.  
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member of Congress.29 In more recent times, like with the Bears Ears 
designation, there are stakeholder meetings with federal and local 
officials and local communities,30 even though the Act does not require 
this step. Generally the relevant land management agency, i.e. the 
Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the National Park Service (NPS), 
the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) in the Department of the Interior, 
or the Forest Service (FS) in the Department of Agriculture, drafts the 
Presidential proclamation and assembles supporting background 
information and maps for the President’s review.31 
The last step in the process calls upon the Council on Environmental 
Quality to review the proposal and make a recommendation to the 
President about whether the monument should be designated. If the 
President accepts the recommendation to designate the monument, he 
issues a proclamation to that effect.32 The President can change the 
proposed size of the monument, add or remove conditions on use of the 
land within the monument’s boundaries, and otherwise revise the 
recommendation—after all, the designation is his.  
The proclamation goes into effect when it is published in the Federal 
Register, usually within a week of presidential issuance.33 The 
proclamation is not issued for public comment, nor is there any other 
federal, state, local or tribal agency involvement in the designation 
process. 
Section 431 contains no guidance on the meaning of its key terms. 
For example, the statute is silent as to what qualifies as a structure or 
object of scientific interest to warrant protection or the amount of land 
                                                          
29 Sanders, supra note 9, at 4 (”The most successful proposals are often those that 
begin as legislation but fail to receive sufficient traction, such as President Obama’s 
three most recent national monuments (originally the subject of conservation bills 
sponsored by Senator Dianne Feinstein).”). 
30 Id.; see also Elperin, supra note 6, at A3 (reporting on Interior Secretary Sally 
Jewell’s “lengthy public hearing”). 
31 Exec. Order No. 11,030, 1 C.F.R. § 19.2, reprinted as amended in 44 U.S.C. 
§ 1505 (2015) (identifying “the Director of Office of Management and Budget as 
the person responsible for” the routing and approval of drafts); see also Sanders, 
supra note 9, at 4; Iraola, supra note 3, at 167 n.30 (explaining in detail this 
process). 
32 Sanders, supra note 9, at 4. 
33 Id. “In 1936, Congress passed the Federal Register Act, legislation requiring 
executive orders and presidential proclamations ‘of general applicability and legal 
effect’ to be published in the Federal Register unless the President concludes 
otherwise on account of national security or other specified reasons.” Iraola, supra 
note 3, at 166. 
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sufficient for their protection. Nor does the section’s legislative history 
shed much light on those terms. Their meaning becomes apparent only 
through their application under the watchful eyes of the courts and 
Congress. Like section 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy 
Act,34 another famously short and controversial statutory provision, the 
meaning of section 431 has been made clear over time by the courts, 
although with many fewer decisions than those interpreting NEPA, 
which has not made its use any less controversial. 
B. Legislative History of the Act 
1. Enactment.35 
In 1889, Congress signed an Act to repair and protect Casa Grande, 
a large, multi-level earthen structure in south-central Arizona Territory 
and directed the President to “reserve [the site] from settlement and 
sale.”36 The Act also authorized the President “to include in the reserve 
as much of the adjacent public lands ‘as in his judgment may be 
necessary’ for protecting the major structure and its associated 
village.”37 President Benjamin Harrison’s issuance of an executive order 
in 1892, that created a 480-acre reservation in accordance with the Act, 
marked the beginning of federal conservation of historic structures in the 
southwest.38 However, this was a one-time only authorization and did 
not grant the President broad powers to protect other historic or 
archaeological sites on public lands.39 
Prior to passage of the act protecting and repairing Casa Grande, 
Congress had passed the Forest Reserve Act, which authorized 
Presidents “to establish forest reserves on public lands by 
                                                          
34 42 U.S.C. § 4332. 
35 See generally Squillace, supra note 25, at 476-86 (discussing the Antiquities 
Act’s legislative history); Sellars, supra note 8, at 267 (giving thorough discussions 
of the enactment legislative history of the 1906 Antiquities Act). 
36 Sellars, supra note 8, at 275. Sellars also notes that “[a] small group centered in 
Boston and including such prominent figures as jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
historian Francis Parkman, and poet John Greenleaf Whittier,” petitioned Congress 
to preserve the area, which may have helped secure the Act’s passage. Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 275-76. 
39 Id. at 276 (noting that “[t]his one-at-a-time approach suggested that the 
preservation community, which included Interior Department officials, especially 
in the General Land Office, could well face lengthy legislative struggles in seeking 
to set aside permanently other important sites.”). 
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proclamation.”40 Presidents used the law “aggressively,” setting aside 
approximately 151 million acres by 1907.41 Reacting to this Presidential 
exuberance, in that same year, Congress rescinded the President’s 
authority to set aside forest reserves in several states with a lot of                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
public lands and also curtailed the use of proclamations by Presidents.42  
Feeling stymied by Congress’ nervousness about excessive 
withdrawals of national forest lands, yet worried about vandalism and 
looting at sites of archaeological importance, and only having as a model 
for congressional action the piecemeal, single site at a time approach of 
the Casa Grande law, the Department of Interior’s General Land Office 
in the 1890s, on its own, began to withdraw from “sale or other 
disposition” lands containing valuable archaeological and natural sites.43 
Examples of such withdrawals include Chaco Canyon, in New Mexico, 
Mesa Verde, in Colorado, the Petrified Forest, in the Arizona Territory, 
and Devils Tower, in Wyoming.44 
In 1890, an early version of the Antiquities Act was introduced in 
Congress. It included all the elements that would appear in the 1906 law 
as well as the principal elements of the 1916 National Park Services 
Act.45 “Much more broadly than with individual national park enabling 
legislation, the Act made explicit that preservation of historic, 
archeological, and other scientific sites on lands controlled by the 
federal government was indeed a federal responsibility.”46 However, the 
bill was a compromise: it included not just historic landmarks and 
structures, but also “other objects of historic or scientific interest,” while 
at the same time it required the President to limit the size of monuments 
“to the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management 
of the protected objects.”47 The ways in which the law was crafted to 
                                                          
40 Sellars, supra note 8, at 276. The Forest Reserve Act was codified at 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 471 et seq. (1897).  
41 Sellars, supra note 8, at 276. 
42 Id. at 276-77. 
43 Id. at 279. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 281-82. This bill, H.R. 11021, 58th Cong. § 1 (1900), “would have 
authorized the president to ‘[s]et apart and reserve tracts of public land, which for 
their scenic beauty, natural wonders or curiosities, ancient ruins or relics, or other 
objects of scientific or historical interest, or springs of medicinal properties it is 
desirable to protect and utilize in the interest of the public.” Sanders, supra note 9, 
at 4. 
46 Sellars, supra note 8, at 295. 
47 Sanders, supra note 9, at 4. 
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resolve conflicting views of the Act’s scope and purpose are set forth 
below. 
During the crafting of the Antiquities Act, the extent of land to be 
reserved to protect a designated object was controversial.48 
 
An open discussion about size occurred on June 5, 1906 just before the 
bill passed the House of Representatives. Congressman John Stephens 
of Texas, apprehensive that too much public land would be, as he 
stated, “locked up” by the Act, asked Congressman John Lacey if the 
antiquities bill would, like the Forest Reserves Act, keep large tracts of 
public land under permanent federal control. Essentially avoiding the 
question, Lacey replied, “Certainly not. The object is entirely different. 
It is to preserve these old objects of special interest and the Indian 
remains in the pueblos in the Southwest.49 
  
“The final version of the bill [Rep. Hewett’s bill] established a 
middle ground between the ‘postage stamp’ archaeological sites favored 
by western legislators, and the large scale reservations that could be 
designated solely for their scenic beauty, as was favored by the 
Department of Interior” by avoiding setting any acreage limit at all.50  
Also at issue was what could be considered “objects of scientific 
interest.” In an unpublished opinion in a challenge to President Carter’s 
designation of various Alaska monuments the District Court for Alaska, 
in the only judicial opinion that actually looked at the legislative history 
of the Antiquities Act, reviewed various bills pending in Congress while 
the Antiquities Act was being considered. This review included a 
proposal by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts to protect 
only “historic and prehistoric ruins, monuments, archaeological objects, 
and antiquities on the public lands.” However, the court, “[n]oting the 
broader language that Congress ultimately approved, concluded that the 
                                                          
48 Sellars, supra note 8, at 295. 
49 Id. at 295-96. 
50 Squillace, supra note 25, at 485; see also id. at 484 (“There was very little debate 
over Hewett's bill, and thus Congress's understanding of what Hewett intended is 
not entirely clear. Those commentators who claim that Hewett's proposed 
legislation was designed to encompass only small tracts of public lands frequently 
cite a colloquy between Congressman Lacey and Congressman John H. Stephens of 
Texas. The House Report on the legislation further seems to support a narrow 
reading of the law. But the compromise language proposed by Hewett does not 
reflect an intent to limit the President's authority as Lacey and others may have 
assumed. On the contrary . . . Hewett . . . had specifically avoid the acreage limits 
of the earlier bills.”). 
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phrase ‘objects of historically scientific interest . . . , was indeed 
intended to enlarge the authority of the President.’”51 
When Congress enacted the Antiquities Act, there were no other 
laws that “specifically authorized the President to set aside lands for 
preservation purposes,” other than the Yellowstone National Park Act, 
which reserved and withdrew approximately two million acres in 
Wyoming, Montana, and Idaho “as a pleasuring ground for the benefit 
and enjoyment of the people.”52 The Forest Reserves Act of 1891, which 
authorized Presidents to set aside and protect forests on public lands 
from among other things entry by homesteaders, did not protect them 
from mining53 While the Antiquities Act was “not necessarily designed 
as a vehicle for public land preservation, it has carried much of that 
burden for many years, and it has performed remarkably well in that 
role, perhaps because the chief executive is in the best position to give 
voice to national preservation goals.”54 
This quick review of the legislative history of the Antiquities Act 
shows that it was a product of compromise between those who had a 
narrow purpose in mind—the protection of historical artifacts—and 
those with something grander in mind—the protection of large beautiful 
areas. Also unresolved in the text and unexplained in the legislative 
history was the amount of land necessary to protect whatever it was that 
was to be protected. Concerns about under-protecting and over-
protecting, which animated the bill’s drafting and passage, continue to 
this day. 
2. Prior attempts to repeal or amend the Antiquities Act. 
At various points in the 111-year history of the Antiquities Act, 
legislation has been introduced to repeal or amend the law, usually in 
reaction to a Presidential designation. For example, in 1943, several bills 
were introduced to repeal or alternatively amend section 431 of the Act 
in response to President Roosevelt’s establishment of the Jackson Hole 
National Monument in Wyoming.55 None of these bills passed 
                                                          
51 Id. at 485 (citing Anaconda Copper Co. v. Andrews, 14 Envtl. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 
1853 (D. Alaska 1980)). 
52 Yellowstone Park Act, 16 U.S.C. § 21 (2015). Squillace, supra note 25, at 487. 
53 Squillace, supra note 25, at 487. 
54 Id. at 488. 
55 Justin James Quigley, Grand Staircase-Escalante Nation Monument: 
Preservation or Politics?, 19 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 55, 84 (1999) 
(“Wyoming Representative Frank A. Barrett introduced House Bill 2591211 and 
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Congress.56 Again, in 1976, in response to President Carter’s “creation 
of seventeen national monuments encompassing 56 million acres in 
Alaska,” Senator Mike Gravel of Alaska introduced a bill to amend the 
Act that would have limited its scope to specific types of historic or 
prehistoric specimens or structures, such as pottery, dwellings, rock 
paintings, carvings, graves, and paleontological specimens “when found 
in an archaeological context.”57 To warrant protection, those objects had 
to be “directly associated with human behavior and activities.”58 Senator 
Gravel’s bill also provided that any reservation that exceeded 5,000 
acres required congressional approval within sixty days to become 
effective.59 It also did not pass.60 
Then, in September 1996, the day after President Clinton designated 
the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument, Representative 
Hansen of Utah introduced House Bill 4118 to amend the Antiquities 
Act by requiring that any national monument in excess of 5,000 acres 
could only be designated by act of Congress with the concurrence of the 
affected state’s governor and state legislature.61 A week later, 
Representative William Orton of Utah introduced a bill “to require that 
any national monument designated by proclamation be approved by 
Congress within 180 days.” Later that same month, Senator Frank 
Murkowski of Alaska introduced Senate Bill 2150, requiring 
congressional approval of any extension or establishment of a national 
monument and that the designations fully comply with NEPA and the 
Endangered Species Act.62 In February, Senator Bennett introduced a 
bill, the “sole purpose” of which was “to codify the promises . . . 
                                                                                                                                       
Senator Edward V. Robertson, also from Wyoming, introduced Senate Bill 
1056212 which proposed to amend the Antiquities Act by rescinding the 
President’s power to establish national monuments and vest such power in 
Congress. Furthermore, to repeal section 2 of the Antiquities Act, Colorado 
Representative J. Edgar Chenoweth introduced House Bill 388423 and Wyoming 
Senator Joseph C. O’Mahoney introduced Senate Bill 1046.”). None of these bills 
was enacted. Id. 
56 Id. at 84.  
57 Id. at 84-85. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 85. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 93. 
62 Id. “In an apparent attempt to protect California from suffering a similar fate as 
Utah, on January 7, 1997, Representative Wally Herger of California introduced 
House Bill 193 to prohibit designation of the Mt. Shasta area in California as a 
national monument under the Antiquities Act.” Id. at 94. 
CONVERTDOC.INPUT.593072.DSQ9K (DO NOT DELETE) 1/17/2018  10:44 PM 
116 STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:1 
 
President Clinton made when he created the monument.”63 Among those 
promises were that the protected area would be managed under multiple 
use principles; that valid existing rights would be honored; that grazing 
could continue; that no federal water rights either express or implied 
would be part of the reservation; that the state’s jurisdiction over fish 
and wildlife would be untouched by the designation; and that an 
advisory committee and planning team for management purposes would 
be established—a veritable litany of local and interest groups concerned 
about federal control over monument lands.64 Further bills were 
introduced requiring congressional approval with the concurrence of or 
consultation with the governor of the state where the proposed 
monument was located.65 One bill required the concurrence of state 
legislatures,66 reflecting concerns about state non-involvement in the 
process. 
In the spring of 1997, Senator Murkowski introduced another bill, 
this one to “ensure that the public and Congress have both the right and 
a reasonable opportunity to participate in decisions that affect the use 
and management of all public lands owned or controlled by the 
Government of the United States.”67 This would be achieved by creating 
notice and comment opportunities in the monument designation process 
for the public as well as for federal, state and local governments.68 A 
year later, a Utah Congressman introduced a bill to modify the 
monument’s boundaries to remove four towns, a producing oil field, and 
a highway, with a caveat that the proposal should not be “construed as 
constituting congressional approval, explicit or implicit” of the 
monument’s establishment.69 
These bills are interesting to the extent that they reflect many of the 
objections that critics of the law have—that designating a monument 
would harm existing economic interests, lock up important resources, 
and be a showcase for federal excesses, and oust existing state 
jurisdiction over important resources like wildlife, and that the process 
excludes any input from state and local governments as well as the 
affected public. Yet despite the concerns animating these bills, none of 





67 Id. at 95. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. Although the bill did not pass, President Clinton accepted the boundary 
changes in a later bill when he signed that bill into law. Id. 
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them was enacted. Although Congress clearly has this power, it chose 
not to exercise it, perhaps because of the low likelihood that a President 
would sign into law legislation that would constrain or revoke the broad 
discretion given to Presidents under the Antiquities Act.”70 Even more 
unlikely would be the ability of western states, which are most directly 
affected by the Antiquities Act, to secure the approval of eastern states 
for such a bill when a vote would be perceived by their electorates as 
anti-environmental and might jeopardize their seats on a matter of no 
particular concern to them.71 
C. Statutory Purpose and Uses Over Time  
The primary purpose animating passage of the Antiquities Act was 
the “desire of archaeologists to protect aboriginal objects and 
artifacts.”72 Contrary to most European countries at the time, United 
States laws granted little protection to archaeological and historic 
objects prior to the Act.73 Before President Theodore Roosevelt 
protected 800,000 acres by designating the Grand Canyon National 
Monument,74 Presidents “used the Act only for small areas of federal 
land that were of either historical or archeological interest.”75 
Presidential designations protected “specific objects of unusual 
historical or scientific value that [stood] out from the landscape by virtue 
of their extraordinary beauty.”76 
                                                          
70 Id. at 95-96. 
71 Id. at 96. 
72 Squillace, supra note 25, at 477; see also Matthew W. Harrison, Legislative 
Delegation and Presidential Authority: The Antiquities Act and the Grand 
Staircase-Escalante National Monument—A Call for a New Judicial Examination, 
13 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 409, 413-14 (1998) (“The Act's passage was the 
culmination of more than six years of lobbying by archeologists and scientific 
institutions who were working to protect important archeological and historical 
sites in the newly-settled western United States. The main purpose behind the Act 
was to protect specific items of antiquity, such as ruins, pottery, and picture 
graphs.”); Iraola, supra note 3, at 162 (“In 1906, Congress passed the Antiquities 
Act, both to respond to concerns over damage to archaeological sites and provide a 
swift means to safeguard federal resources and lands.”). 
73 Lin, supra note 17, at 713. See also id. at 721 (“In most instances, however, 
presidential designation followed Congressional inaction or failed attempts to reach 
consensus.”). 
74 Harrison, supra note 72, at 416. 
75 Id. at 417. 
76 Ranchod, supra note 10, at 569. 
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One of the original sponsors of the Antiquities Act, Congressman 
John Lacey, however, worried about “waste and misuse of natural 
resources—about, as he put it, mankind’s ‘omnidestructive’ ways. If 
such destruction continue[d], he warned, the world would become ‘as 
worthless as a sucked orange.’”77 In this way, he said, the “Antiquities 
Act is a counterweight to the pressures that drive us toward expediency. 
The Act forces us to think in the long term and on a large scale, to 
occasionally make the choice to leave our children and their Earth more 
than a series of small, isolated parks.”78  
It took over half a century to have Congressman Lacey’s concern 
acted on in a grand way by a President using his authority under the 
Antiquities Act. President Clinton’s national monument designations 
shifted the focus of the Act from protecting structures and scientific 
objects to protecting entire ecosystems from threats to those landscapes. 
These Clinton monuments protect lands that were part of a major river’s 
drainage basin, a forest, or a desert ecosystem,79 regardless of whether 
there was a discernible natural feature, like Devils Tower. They were 
very large, much larger in size that those that protected single structures 
or individual objects of scientific interest.80 For example, Grand 
Staircase-Escalante National Monument encompasses 1.9 million acres 
of BLM lands in southern Utah:81 a size equivalent to the states of 
Delaware and Rhode Island combined, and covers most of two large 
Utah counties.82 It is one of the “largest national monuments located 
                                                          
77 Sellars, supra note 8, at 286-87. 
78 Sanders, supra note 9, at 7. 
79 Ranchod, supra note 10, at 569 (“Most of the landscape monuments protect 
natural ecosystems. The Grand Canyon-Parashant National Monument was created, 
for example, to protect lands that are part of the drainage basin for the Colorado 
River and the Grand Canyon. Other landscape monuments protect canyonlands, 
coastal areas, and forest, shrub-steppe, marine, riparian, and desert ecosystems.”). 
80 Squillace, supra note 25, at 513 (“The vast literature that has developed in recent 
years describing landscape ecology and ecosystem management offers strong 
support for the claim that a landscape or ecosystem is a legitimate object of 
scientific interest.”). 
81 Thomas Cannon, Utah Association of Counties v. Bush: A Look at How the 
Federal District Court of Utah Upheld the Creation of the Grand Staircase-
Escalante National Monument Through the Antiquities Act, 25 J. LAND RESOURCES 
& ENVTL. L. 63, 63 (2005). 
82 Harrison, supra note 72, at 410. 
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within the continental United States.”83 By doing this, President Clinton 
“reestablished the Antiquities Act as one of the most powerful 
conservation tools available to the executive.” 84  
Although not a declared purpose, an indirect benefit of the Act’s 
application has been to protect lands surrounding the monument that 
otherwise might have been vulnerable to development because 
protective legislation was languishing in Congress.85 An example of this 
was President Carter’s designation of 19 monuments in Alaska that 
protected fifty-six million acres of land from development while 
legislation to protect these areas was stymied in Congress.86 National 
monument proclamations layer on additional protections to federal lands 
“by withdrawing them from entry, location, sale, or other disposition 
under the public land laws—that is, from mining, logging, oil and gas 
production, grazing, off-road vehicles, and other such uses.”87 “These 
restrictions are effectively permanent,”88 disrupting settled expectations 
of individuals and companies whose livelihoods had depended on 
extracting renewable and nonrenewable resources from these lands. 
The allowable uses of lands reserved to protect a designated 
monument vary monument to monument according to the purposes for 
                                                          
83 Ranchod, supra note 10, at 570. “Clinton established five of the ten largest 
monuments established by presidential proclamation in the lower forty-eight 
states.” Id. 
84 Id. at 582; see also id. (“[T]his executive leadership was justified and proper 
given the history of congressional acquiescence to expansive use of the Act, 
judicial interpretation of the Act, and political considerations.”). 
85 Lin, supra note 17, at 736 (“Nevertheless, given the sometimes glacial progress 
of proposed legislation, there is some value to a process that can react seasonably to 
time-sensitive, though not ‘emergency,’ matters.”); see also Adrian Vermeule, 
Optimal Abuse of Power, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 673, 684 (2015) (“The veto-gates; 
second, third, and nth opinions; and interbranch checks and balances that, in a 
Madisonian system, are intended to promote reasoned deliberation, and launder out 
passion and interest, together ensure that legislatures will ‘come too late’ to the 
resolution of an increasing fraction of policy problems.”); id. (“Even so, Congress’s 
agenda is so radically compacted and constrained that it is routine for critical policy 
problems to languish indefinitely on the congressional docket even as extant law 
becomes risibly maladapted to the relevant problems as the policy environment 
changes over time.”). 
86 Presidential Statement on Designation of National Monuments in Alaska, in 1978 
PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, Jimmy Carter (1980).  
87 Sanders, supra note 9, at 4. 
88 Id. 
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which each monument is created.89 These uses are set forth in a land-use 
management plan prepared by the agency with jurisdiction over the land 
housing the monument.90 The new large landscape monuments shifted 
management from the National Park Service (NPS), which traditionally 
had managed national monuments, to land management agencies like 
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Forest Service (FS) 
because the protected lands fell within their jurisdictions.91 Grand 
Staircase-Escalante National Monument is the first monument BLM has 
managed; Giant Sequoia National Monument is the first one the FS has 
managed.92  
One effect of shifting management from NPS to BLM and FS is the 
application of a less protective management standard, which allows 
“compatible uses.”93 This more forgiving standard is different than the 
requirement in the National Park Service Organic Act that lands in that 
system be left “unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations,”94 a 
management mandate that is not specifically stated in the Antiquities 
                                                          
89 Squillace, supra note 25, at 519 (“[N]ational monuments are a bit like 
snowflakes, each with a character of its own.”). 
90 Sellars, supra note 8, at 282. Seven of the twenty World Heritage sites, places 
considered to have “outstanding international significance,” were initially protected 
under the Antiquities Act. Id. 
91 One interesting feature of BLM-managed monuments is that they are “managed 
in partnership with the surrounding communities. This arrangement means that 
BLM has no public facilities on its monuments’ grounds, which forces visitors to 
patronize local communities.” Ranchod, supra note 10, at 572. National 
monuments managed by the BLM are to be managed in partnership with the 
surrounding communities. To this end, the BLM will not provide major facilities 
for food, lodging, or visitor services within landscape monuments. Rather, visitors 
will be encouraged to see the lands in their primitive states, and access will be 
limited to certain areas. Visitor contact and information facilities may be located in 
adjacent communities or on the periphery of units. “For example, the Grand 
Staircase-Escalante National Monument management plan limits visitor 
development to peripheral land on the outer four percent of the monument.” Id. 
This may explain the economic uptick in these communities after the enthusiasm of 
monument designation. 
92 Id. at 570. Ten other monuments created by Clinton are also managed 
exclusively by BLM. Id. 
93 Id. at 571; see also Sanders, supra note 9, at 5 (“The BLM and the Forest Service 
come at land management from a ‘multiple use’ perspective that tends, on paper 
and in practice, to be more permissive than the Park Service’s clear preservation 
mandate.”). 
94 16 U.S.C. § 1 (current version at 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a)). 
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Act.95 While existing commercial activities are permitted on national 
parkland, subject to “valid existing rights,”96 new ones, like mining, oil 
and gas development, and logging, are generally prohibited by the 
nonimpairment standard.97 Thus, Clinton and Obama’s designations of 
monuments on multi-purpose federal land (public domain and national 
forest lands) actually weakened protection for them, even though each 
President withdrew an enormous amount of land from new extractive 
uses.98  
D. Judicial Interpretation of the President’s Authority under the Act 
Courts provide almost no check on the President’s authority under 
the Antiquities Act. Judges limit their review of presidential 
designations to the question of whether “the President has facially 
exercised his discretion in accordance with the Act’s standards,” and 
generally broadly interpret the President’s authority under the Act.99 
This judicial deference extends to whether the geographic area protected 
by the designation is properly sized and whether the objects qualify for 
protection.100  
                                                          
95 Sellars, supra note 8, at 317. However, while Sellars notes that the NPSOA “did 
not alter the authorization and facilitation of professional research in the 
monuments . . . it did specifically authorize public use and enjoyment to take place 
on site in the monuments, a mandate that differed from the Antiquities Act's 
emphasis on education through universities and museums. Thus, like the national 
parks, the national monuments would themselves become outdoor education 
centers.”). 
96 Sanders, supra note 9, at 5.  
97 See National Park Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (current version at 54 
U.S.C. § 100101(a)) (“The service thus established shall promote and regulate the 
use of the federal areas known as national parks, monuments, and reservations 
hereinafter specified . . . by such means and measures as conform to the 
fundamental purpose of the said parks, monuments and reservations, which purpose 
is to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wildlife 
therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such 
means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.”) 
(emphasis added); see also Ranchod, supra note 10, at 572; id. (“All Clinton-
created monuments have been withdrawn from disposition under the Mining Act of 
1872.”). 
98 Ranchod, supra note 10, at 573. 
99 Iraola, supra note 3, at 184. 
100 Id. at 185-86 (“With respect to the second substantive requirement, that the 
designation of the national monument ‘be confined to the smallest area compatible 
with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected[,]’ courts 
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[W]here a claim concerns not a want of [presidential] power, but a 
mere excess or abuse of discretion in exerting a power given, it is clear 
that it involves considerations which are beyond the reach of judicial 
power. This must be since, as this court has often pointed out, the 
judicial may not invade the legislative or executive departments so as 
to correct alleged mistakes or wrongs arising from asserted abuse of 
discretion.101  
 
Thus, the Court in Cameron v. United States102 quickly dispatched 
an argument by petitioner that the Grand Canyon lacked any historical 
or scientific interest.103 While the Court does not directly address the 
language in the Act requiring that the monument’s size should be the 
“smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the 
objects to be protected,” the “clear implication of the Court’s decision 
was that the size of the monument was not disqualifying if the ‘protected 
object’ was otherwise of ‘scientific interest.’”104  
In Cappaert v. United States, the United States sought to enjoin 
groundwater pumping by a local farmer, which lowered the water level 
in Devil’s Hole, an important feature in Death Valley National 
Monument.105 The Court dismissed an argument challenging the 
historical and scientific value of Death Valley National Monument, 
explaining that while the Act allows for areas to be designated that have 
either historical or scientific value, because the Death Valley National 
Monument had both historical and scientific interests, the President 
acted within his delegated authority when he designated the 
monument.106 In Tulare County v. Bush,107 relying on Cappaert, the 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals also inferentially supported the concept of 
landscape or ecosystem designations to the extent that the decision held 
that the President’s authority under the Act was “not limited to 
protecting only archaeological sites”; nor did the Act “‘impose upon the 
                                                                                                                                       
generally accord to the President's factual determinations substantial judicial 
deference.”). 
101 Cannon, supra note 81, at 67 (quoting Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 474 
(1994)). 
102 252 U.S. 450 (1920). 
103 Harrison, supra note 72, at 418. 
104 Squillace, supra note 25, at 492. 
105 426 U.S. 128 (1976); Harrison, supra note 72, at 418. 
106 Harrison, supra note 72, at 418. 
107 306 F.3d 1138 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
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President an obligation to make any particular investigation’ regarding 
the scope and size of the designated memorial.”108  
In a 1978 case involving a jurisdictional dispute between California 
and the United States over the waters and submerged lands in the 
Channel Islands National Monument,109 the Supreme Court continued an 
expansionist view of the Antiquities Act’s scope by affirming President 
Truman’s earlier reservation of submerged lands and the waters over 
those lands as part of a national monument.110 “[T]he Court recognized 
that, although the Act refers to “lands,” it authorizes the reservation of 
waters located on or over federal lands.”111 
U.S. district courts, for the most part, have followed the Supreme 
Court’s lead. In Wyoming v. Franke,112 involving a challenge to 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s designation of 220,000 acres as 
the Jackson Hole National Monument, the U.S. District Court of 
Wyoming found “sufficient evidence of historic and scientific interest to 
uphold the basic designation of the national monument,”113 saying, “if 
there be evidence in the case of a substantial character upon which the 
President may have acted in declaring that there were objects of historic 
of [sic] scientific interest included within the area, it is sufficient upon 
which he may have based a discretion.”114 The District Court Judge 
added: 
 
[T]his seems to be a controversy between the Legislative and 
Executive Branches of the Government in which, under the evidence 
presented here, the Court cannot interfere. Undoubtedly great hardship 
and a substantial amount of injustice will be done to the State and her 
citizens if the Executive Department carries out its threatened program, 
but if Congress presumes to delegate its inherent authority to 
Executive Departments which exercise acquisitive proclivities not 
                                                          
108 Iraola, supra note 3, at 178. 
109 United States v. California, 436 U.S. 32 (1978). 
110 Iraola, supra note 3, at 174. Those lands and waters were eventually conveyed 
to California. Id. 
111 Id. 
112 58 F. Supp. 890 (D. Wyo. 1945). 
113 Harrison, supra note 72, at 420-21. 
114 Id. at 421 (quoting Wyoming v. Franke, 58 F. Supp. 890, 895 (D. Wyo. 1945). 
Harrison noted, however that the court “refused to determine whether the national 
monument designation was the smallest area compatible to protect the legitimate 
interest,” considering that “that this question was outside the court's jurisdiction. It 
further refused to determine whether the president’s designating the national 
monument were arbitrary or capricious . . . .” Id. 
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actually intended, the burden is on the Congress to pass such remedial 
legislation as may obviate any injustice brought about as the power 
and control over and disposition of government lands inherently rests 
in its Legislative Branch. What has been said with reference to the 
objects of historic and scientific interest applies equally to the 
discretion of the Executive in defining the area compatible with the 
proper care and management of the objects to be protected.115 
  
For the court, as long as there was “evidence ‘of a substantial 
character’” supporting the President’s determination that there were 
objects of scientific or historic interest on the withdrawn public lands, 
which also supported the determination that the withdrawn acreage was 
compatible with the care and management of those objects, “any further 
judicial review with respect to the President’s exercise of discretion 
under the Act was not permitted.”116  
In Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Bush,117 petitioners 
challenged President Clinton’s designation of six New Mexico national 
monuments on ultra vires grounds, among other claims.118 The basis of 
the ultra vires challenge was that only Congress had the power to make 
rules affecting public lands.119 The Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the ultra vires 
claim on the ground that President Clinton “exercised his delegated 
                                                          
115 Franke, 58 F. Supp. at 896; see also Harrison, supra note 72, at 422. 
116 Iraola, supra note 3, at 182. “The court further noted that given the nature of the 
controversy, the ‘burden [wa]s on the Congress to pass such remedial legislation as 
may obviate any injustice brought about as the power and control over and 
disposition of government lands inherently rests in its Legislative branch.’” Id.; see 
also id. at 171 (“In the case of the Antiquities Act, while it grants the President 
broad discretion, and separation of powers concerns are present, the statute also 
contains some restrictions. Judicial review ‘is available to ensure that the 
Proclamations are consistent with constitutional principles and that the President 
has not exceeded his statutory authority.’”); Cannon, supra note 81, at 70 
(describing the court’s decision in Utah Association of Counties, and saying “[t]he 
court continued what has become the tradition in preventing parties from bringing 
any causes of action against the President for a violation of the Antiquities Act.” In 
deciding that it would not decide on the exercise of the President's discretion, the 
court quoted Justice Scalia's concurrence in Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 
788, 827 (1992), who said, “I think we cannot issue a declaratory judgment against 
the President. It is incompatible with his constitutional position that he be 
compelled personally to defend his executive actions before the court.”).  
117 306 F.3d 1132 (D.C. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 124 S.Ct. 61 (2003). 
118 Iraola, supra note 3, at 176. 
119 Id. 
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powers under the Antiquities Act, and that statute include[d] intelligible 
principles to guide the President’s action.”120 
The one potential caveat to this unbroken chain of court decisions 
affirming Presidential authority to designate national monuments is an 
unpublished bench ruling in a case challenging President Carter’s 
designation of nineteen monuments in Alaska. In that case, the U.S. 
District Court for Alaska indicated that there might be limits to the 
amount of acreage that a President could withdraw under the Act.121 The 
judge found that the land President Carter reserved “was more than 
necessary” to protect objects identified as having historic or scientific 
interest,122 and that the withdrawn lands exceeded the amount of land 
necessary to fulfill the purpose of the designations.123 But, the judge 
admitted that “while the ‘outer parameters’ of presidential discretion 
under the Act had ‘not yet been drawn by judicial decision,’” President 
Carter’s proclamations at issue did not exceed his authority under the 
Act.124 In the wake of President Carter’s action, Congress enacted strict 
procedural limitations on the future use of the Antiquities Act in Alaska, 
preventing any future designations of “large tracts of federal lands as 
national monuments” in Alaska.125 
Congress appears to have delegated to the President fairly 
unbounded authority to protect lands and the structures and objects on 
them, if they hold any archaeological or scientific interest. For over 111 
years, Presidents of both political parties have exercised their authority 
under the Act to protect small plots of land like President Lincoln and 
Soldiers’ Home National Monument (2.3 acres), in Washington D.C. 
protected by President Clinton, or Cabrillo National Monument 
                                                          
120 Id. at 176 (quoting Mountain States Legal Found. v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1132 (D.C. 
Cir. 2002)). 
121 See Anaconda Copper Co. v. Andrus, 14 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1853 (D. 
Alaska 1980) (challenging President Carter’s use of the Antiquities Act to establish 
fifteen new national monuments, expand two existing ones, and withdraw more 
than fifty-six million acres in Alaska); see also Harrison, supra note 72, at 430. 
122 Id. at 430-31. 
123 Id. at 431. 
124 Iraola, supra note 3, at 184. 
125 Harrison, supra note 72, at 431 n.148 (discussing 16 U.S.C. §3213(a) (1994) 
(“The Land Conservation Act provided a procedural limitation that any future 
national monument designations in Alaska would not be allowed without a 
congressional hearing and approval of the national monument within a certain time 
period.”); see also Lin, supra note 17, at 716 (“ANILCA also made potential future 
withdrawals in Alaska under the Antiquities Act of more than 5,000 acres subject 
to congressional approval.”). 
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protected by President Taft (0.50 acres) in California and huge 
landscapes, like Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument 
protected by President Clinton (1,700,000 acres) in Arizona or Glacier 
Bay protected by President Coolidge (1,164,800 acres) in Alaska.126 
Congress, with rare exception, has not intervened; the courts not at all. 
By statutory design, neither the public nor its elected officials play any 
official role in the designation process, a process that often ends with a 
land use decision disrupting prior uses of the land. At least one sponsor 
of the legislation, Congressman Lacey had that result in mind even 
though it appears to have caught succeeding generation of legislators by 
surprise as they react to more expansive uses of the Act in an era of 
legislative stalemate.  
The next Part of the article uses this background information as a 
platform from which to observe some of the modern controversies 
generated by the Act’s application as well as more general criticisms of 
its provisions. 
III. CONTROVERSIES ASSOCIATED WITH SPECIFIC MONUMENT 
DESIGNATIONS AND GENERAL CRITICISM OF THE ACT  
In one form or another, there are Boston Tea parties still going on 
every day in some part of America in infinite varieties of the 
constitutional right to seek a redress of grievances.127 
 
Individual monument designations have incited opposition from 
local communities surrounding the monuments. Local disapproval 
generally focuses on anticipated adverse economic impacts and lifestyle 
changes caused by designation of a national monument, loss of revenue 
from traditional sources like ranching and mining, and federal over-
regulation of the protected area. Western lawmakers and extractive 
industries, like mining, oil, and gas, “resent” orders emanating from 
Washington that restrict their operations on public lands.128 More 
generally, the Act is criticized for the undemocratic nature of the 
designation process, the President’s usurpation of congressional 
                                                          
126 Ranchod, supra note 10, at app. A at 585-88. 
127 Scott W. Reed, The County Supremacy Movement: Mendacious Myth 
Marketing, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 525, 526 (1994). 
128 Ranchod, supra note 10, at 584 (“Although the American public generally 
supports greater protection of unique federal lands, western lawmakers and 
politically powerful extractive industries resent orders from Washington, D.C, 
restricting the use of federal lands.”). 
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authority to manage the public lands, and ineffective judicial review of 
presidential actions under the Act.129 Some of these criticisms dovetail 
with the less focused economic and cultural criticisms. 
As made clear below, the criticisms of the Antiquities Act and of 
specific designations like Bears Ears reflect the general anti-federal 
feelings in the Intermountain West. As those feelings modulate and the 
specific complaints about the negative effects of designation prove to be 
untrue over time, the resistance to both the law and specific designations 
should disappear, and, in fact, is already lessening. 
A.  The Political and Cultural Firestorms around Bears Ears and Grand 
Staircase-Escalante Designations  
San Juan County, the site of both Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-
Escalante national monuments is the largest county in Utah.130 The 
federal government manages 61.4% of the land in the county and Indian 
tribes, principally the Navajo Nation, governs 25.2% of the land, leaving 
the state, controlling only 5.3%, and private and local governments 
controlling a mere 8.1% of the land.131 The County is also the least 
populous in the state and has the lowest per-capita income.132 Not 
surprisingly, given these statistics, the County is also ground zero for 
opposition to the Antiquities Act and the designation of national 
monuments under that statute. 
The over-heated rhetoric employed, and subsequent flurry of bills 
introduced by Utah’s congressional delegation after President Obama’s 
designation of Bears Ears in San Juan County illustrate this opposition. 
For example, U.S. Representative Rob Bishop, chair of the House 
Committee on Natural Resources, “called President Obama’s 
monuments a ‘surreptitious land grab’ and an ‘authoritarian act’ of 
‘presidential bullying,’” and “vowed to push legislation” to “right size” 
                                                          
129 See Lin, supra note 17, at 725 (“the anti-monument discourse advocating local 
governance and democratic participation potentially reveals itself as no more than a 
rhetorical front for interest groups seeking to achieve particular policy outcomes.”). 
130 JOHN C. RUPLE, ROBERT B. KEITER & ANDRE OGNIBENE, NATIONAL 
MONUMENTS AND NATIONAL CONSERVATION AREAS: A COMPARISON IN LIGHT OF 
THE BEARS EARS PROPOSAL, Stegner Center, White Paper No. 2016-02 (2016) at 2. 
131 Id. 
132 Id.  
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the monument.133 Other members of Congress share Representative 
Bishop’s outrage and have consequently introduced twelve bills to 
curtail or revoke Presidential authority under the Antiquities Act, 
carrying titles like the Preserving State Rights Act (H.R. 4132, 114th 
Cong. (2015)) and Protecting Local Communities from Executive 
Overreach Act (H.R. 3946, 114th Cong. (2015)).134 Among the list of 
things these bills would do is to 
 
require advance approval from states or local communities or both; 
limit new monuments to 5,000 acres; require Congress and the affected 
state to approve any new monument either before or within three years 
of its designation; preclude new monuments in certain counties, states, 
or off-road vehicle areas; prohibit the reservation of federal water 
rights; preclude the restriction of allowable uses absent public 
comment and congressional approval; require public hearings; and 
subject new designations to review under the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA).135 
 
The response to Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument 
serves as a helpful model for understanding many of the criticisms 
levelled against Presidential use of the Antiquities Act. President 
Clinton’s designation of that monument, its size and the lack of 
consultation with state and local officials, and complete absence of 
public participation during the designation process created significant 
opposition to the monument.136 Critics additionally complained that it 
“was not within the spirit of the law” because it was “a leap from 
protecting the large ruins of the southwest as contemplated by the 
Antiquities Act to protecting ‘packrat middens,’ that were identified in 
                                                          
133 Corbin Hlar, et al., Bishop vows bills aimed at Bears Ears, ‘damn’ Antiquities 
Act, E & E NEWS (April 26, 2017), 
http://www.eenews.net/eedaily/stories/1060053590/print. 
134 Sanders, supra note 9, at 5. 
134 Sanders, supra note 9, at 5. 
135 Id. 
136 Cannon, supra note 81, at 65 (“President Clinton's action created heavy 
controversy, which was exacerbated by the lack of advance consultation with 
Utah's federal and state officials. Of particular insult to these officials was the fact 
that the Grand Staircase announcement was made in Arizona at the Grand Canyon, 
not in Utah. Part of the controversy came because the federal royalties from the 
Smokey Hollow Coal Mine would have been around twenty billion dollars, half of 
which would have gone to Utah.”). 
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the GSENM’s proclamation.”137 They also argued that the creation of 
the monument was purely for “political not preservation reasons” and 
barred development of the Kaiparowits coal field, one of the “nation’s 
most precious coal resource.”138 State and local officials were concerned 
about the effect of the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument on 
176,000 acres of Utah’s school trust lands in the designated area and the 
revenues the state might otherwise receive from mining on those lands, 
estimated to be around $300 billion in total, of which $2 billion would 
go into the state’s school trust fund.139 Local communities adjacent to 
the monument feared its designation would chill new employment, slow 
economic growth, and lead to over-regulation of the public lands that 
surround them.140 While a similar uproar followed President Obama’s 
designation of Bears Ears National Monument,141 President Obama, 
unlike President Clinton, gave fair warning of his interest in preserving 
the core of what became the national monument when it included Cedar 
Mesa on a 2010 list of candidate sites for protection under the 
Antiquities Act.142 This action precipitated both formal and informal 
discussions on how the area might be preserved, which, in 2015, led to a 
formal request from a coalition of local Indians to President Obama to 
designate a 1.9 million acre monument.143 In contrast, President Clinton 
held no public meetings and arguably “hid the ball” from the public as 
well as state and local officials until he announced the Grand Staircase-
Escalante monument’s designation from the rim of the Grand Canyon.144 
Many of the complaints voiced following both designations are 
easily responded to. For example, money raised from school trust lands 
make up only a small proportion of a school district’s overall budget—in 
                                                          
137 Quigley, supra note 55, at 101. 
138 Id. 
139 Harrison, supra note 72, at 410-11.  
140 Id. at 411. In fact, Utah’s Office of Tourism is spending millions of dollars 
promoting the state’s five national parks and “boasting” that they attract several 
million visitors a year from all over the world, four of which were first protected 
under the Antiquities Act. John D. Leshy & Mark Squillace, The Endangered 
Antiquities Act, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2017, at A23. 
141 See generally Julie Turkewitz, A Vast Divide, Fight Intensifies as Trump 
Rethinks Monument Status for Utah Expanse, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2017, at A11 
(recounting many of the local objections to the monument designation). 
142 Jonathan Thompson, Fact-checking Trump’s Antiquities Act order, HIGH 
COUNTRY NEWS 2 (April 26, 2017), http://www.hcn.org/articles/fact-checking-
hatch-trump-on-bears-ears-national-monument/print_view. 
143 Id. 
144 Cannon, supra note 81, at 65. 
CONVERTDOC.INPUT.593072.DSQ9K (DO NOT DELETE) 1/17/2018  10:44 PM 
130 STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:1 
 
San Juan County, one percent of its school budget—and are distributed 
statewide.145 In addition, the state retains control over school trust lands 
and the schools received $50 million from the federal government from 
the Grand Staircase-Escalante monument designation in a land exchange 
with the federal government.146 The state school board rejected a similar 
proposal from the Obama Administration.147 Ironically a report by the 
Wilderness Society found that Utah has sold off 54% of the original 7.5 
million acres in school trust lands which it received upon becoming a 
state148 and that, according to the Census Bureau, Utah spends less per 
student than any state in the Union.149 The Bears Ears Monument’s final 
boundaries excluded areas rich with both paleontological and uranium 
resources as well as other areas where historically there was drilling for 
oil, and there are no pending leases within the monument boundaries.150 
The proclamation preserves existing grazing leases and new ones are 
allowed.151  
As for killing jobs and destroying the local economy, a 2017 report 
by Headwater Economics, which examined “gateway communities” 
adjacent to seventeen monuments of 10,000 acres or more in eleven 
Western states designated between 1982 and 2001, found “no evidence” 
that these designations inhibited economic growth.152 In fact, the report 
found that “the local economies surrounding all 17 of the national 
monuments studied expanded following the creation of the new national 
monuments.”153 “Across the board, trends in important economic 
indicators either continued or improved” in each of the areas studied, 
including a rise in personal wealth, which the report found significant 
because in rural areas this indicator is often declining.154 The report also 
                                                          
145 Id. at 3-4. 
146 Id. at 4. 
147 Id. 
148 Scott Streater, Federal transfers to Utah would shut pubic out—report, E & E 
NEWS (May 22, 2017), 
http://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/stories/1060054918/print. 
149 Id.  
150 Thompson, supra note 142, at 4. 
151 Id. at 5. 
152 HEADWATERS ECONOMICS, UPDATED SUMMARY: THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE 
OF NATIONAL MONUMENTS TO LOCAL COMMUNITIES 3 (2017). 
153 Id. at 1. While the report data showed “continued economic growth in nearby 
communities,” the data “do not demonstrate a cause a cause-and-effect 
relationship” between monument designation and economic growth. Id. 
154 Id. 
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noted that “protected natural amenities,” like national monuments and 
their surrounding land, “help sustain property values and attract new 
investments.”155 According to the report, these communities had an 
increase in non-labor income (investments, real estate, and government 
paychecks like social security) of $189 million in 2015—an increase of 
49% from 2001—and service jobs (teaching, engineering, health related) 
increased by 42% over the same period, with per-capita income 
increasing by 17% to nearly $36,000 on average.156 As for the counties 
hosting the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument, they 
“experienced strong growth after the designation of the monument, 
continuing previous growth trends.” Overall, from 2001-2015 in the 
Grand Staircase-Escalante Region, population grew by 13%, jobs by 
24%, real personal income by 32%, and real per capita income by 
17%).157 There is no reason not to expect a similar growth in local 
economy from the designation of the Bears Ears National Monument, 
which explains why the Utah State Tourist Board is promoting the new 
monument.158 
There have been other examples of political backlash to monument 
designations in the not too distant past. For example, a Republican-
controlled Congress refused to appropriate funds for ten years for the 
management of the Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Monument, designated by 
President Eisenhower in 1961, after a Democrat-controlled Congress 
refused to protect the area.159 President Lyndon Johnson’s last minute 
signature on proclamations enlarging Arches and Capitol Reef national 
monuments provoked angry rhetoric from Utah’s Senators who 
criticized the President’s “unilateral and arbitrary” action.160 Utah 
Senator Bob Bennett “proclaimed President Johnson’s national 
monuments a ‘last gasp attempt to embalm a little more land in the 
West.’”161 However, the vehemence and sustained nature of the outcry 
against President Clinton and President Obama’s designations and the 
use of the presidential bully pulpit to oppose their national monuments 
                                                          
155 Id. at 2. 
156 Jennifer Yachnin, Communities near large sites see economic growth—report, E 
& E NEWS (June 1, 2017), 
http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060055414/print. 
157 HEADWATERS ECONOMICS, supra note 152, at 1. 
158 Thompson, supra note 142, at 5. 
159 Lin, supra note 17, at 716. 
160 Id. 
161 Sanders, supra note 9, at 5. 
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are unusual.162 
B. General Criticisms of the Antiquities Act and the Response to Those 
Claims 
Typical criticisms of the Antiquities Act focus on two issues: the 
Act’s alleged usurpation of Congress’ authority under the Property 
Clause “to make all needful rules,” respecting the property of the United 
States163 and on the Act’s undemocratic lack of public participation in 
the designation process.164 Since withdrawals under the Antiquities Act 
are “more permanent,” they argue that they “should be subject to greater 
procedural requirements and more thorough deliberation to ensure 
careful and well-informed decisions.”165 Additionally, critics perceive 
the Act’s designation process as “unfair” because of the limited 
opportunity for affected communities and local interests to participate in 
the decision-making process and the adverse effects of designations on 
those same communities and on those who use public lands.166 
Supporters of the Act have responses for each of those arguments and 
argue that strong executive authority, like that found in the Antiquities 
Act, is necessary if public lands are to be preserved for future 
generations.167 
1. Legal concerns. 
Opponents of the Antiquities Act frequently raise multiple legal 
concerns, for example that the statute divests Congress of its 
constitutional responsibility to make “all needful rules” regarding the 
sale and management of United States property in violation of the 
Property Clause of the Constitution. They also contend that the Act 
                                                          
162 See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & Christopher Yoo, The Bounds of Executive 
Discretion in the Regulatory State, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1593 (2016) (“The 
President’s power to cajole has been well-established and acknowledged to be 
influential.”). 
163 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
164 Squillace, supra note 25, at 474-75. 
165 Lin, supra note 17, at 733. 
166 Sanders, supra note 9, at 5-6 (“The Antiquities Act’s critics raise three 
objections most often: (1) the Act appropriates power that properly resides with 
Congress under the Property Clause (or with the states); (2) democracy and 
informed decision making demand that the public have the right to review and 
comment on proposed designations; and (3) national monument designations harm 
the economies of local communities.”). 
167 Id. at 6-7. 
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violates the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because the 
President’s actions are not preceded by public notice and comment, and 
that it runs counter to NEPA, which requires that major federal actions 
significantly affecting the human environment must be accompanied by 
a statement describing and analyzing those impacts.168 The silver lining 
to the concerns raised under the APA and NEPA is that they “underscore 
the degree to which procedures for public notice and comment, such as 
those required by the Administrative Procedure Act (in the context of 
rulemaking) and NEPA, have become engrained in the public’s 
understanding of democratic norms.”169  
a. Violates the Property Clause. 
Critics argue that the Property Clause170 gave Congress, not the 
President, the power to manage public lands.171 Therefore, the President 
has no authority to affect public lands by designating objects on those 
lands as national monuments or withdrawing those land to protect 
objects on them. However, Congress has specifically delegated that 
authority to the President in the Antiquities Act.  
Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Bush172 upheld that delegation 
when it rejected a challenge to President Clinton’s designation of six 
New Mexico national monuments on ultra vires grounds.173 
Petitionerargued, in part, that only Congress had the power to make 
rules affecting public lands.174 The Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit, however, disagreed, and affirmed the lower court 
decision, finding that President Clinton had properly exercised his 
delegated powers under the Antiquities Act, which contained intelligible 
principles to guide his action.175 The contention by “legal formalists and 
                                                          
168 See, e.g., Cannon, supra note 81, at 66-67 (raising many of these claims). 
Cannon also argues that the APA applies because, in the case of Grand Staircase-
Escalante designation, the Secretary of Interior made the final decision. Id. While it 
is true that the Secretary of Interior makes recommendations to the President about 
which monuments should be designated, puts together a report, and drafts the 
declaration, only the President signs and issues the designating proclamation. Id. at 
68. 
169 Lin, supra note 17, at 738. 
170 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
171 See Arnold & Porter, supra note 12, at 4. 
172 306 F.3d 1132 (D.C. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 812 (2003). 
173 Id. at 1137. 
174 Id.  
175 Id. at 174-76. 
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originalists . . . that the Antiquities Act, in giving the president wide-
ranging power to designate national monuments, violates the non-
delegation doctrine and intrudes on Congress’s plenary authority over 
the federal public lands”176 is easily met by Mountain States’ finding 
that the Antiquities Act has “intelligible principles” to guide the 
President’s actions. Additionally, “court decisions upholding the Act 
against all manner of challenges, and the fact that Congress has the last 
word on whether particular monuments, and indeed the Act itself, 
remain on the books,” also counter the formalist/originalist 
arguments.177  
b. Violates the Administrative Procedure Act. 
The Act’s detractors also argue that Presidents who designate 
monuments under the Antiquities Act are violating the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA). Although the APA does not specifically exclude 
the President from its scope, courts have held that it does.178 Since only 
the President has affirmative duties under the Antiquities Act, for the 
APA to apply, therefore, an agency, like BLM or the FS, not the 
President, must make the decision to designate a national monument. 
But only Presidents have the delegated authority to designate national 
monuments. 
Proponents of this argument contend that Executive Order No. 
                                                          
176 Sanders, supra note 9, at 5. 
177 Id. 
178 See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800-801 (1992) (“The APA 
defines ‘agency’ as ‘each authority of the Government of the United States, 
whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency, but does not 
include—(A) the Congress; (B) the courts of the United States; (C) the 
governments of the territories or possessions of the United States; (D) the 
government of the District of Columbia.’ 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(b)(1), 551(1). The 
President is not explicitly excluded from the APA's purview, but he is not explicitly 
included, either. Out of respect for the separation of powers and the unique 
constitutional position of the President, we find that textual silence is not enough to 
subject the President to the provisions of the APA. We would require an express 
statement by Congress before assuming it intended the President's performance of 
his statutory duties to be reviewed for abuse of discretion.”); see also Cannon, 
supra note 81, at 71. In their unsuccessful challenge to President Clinton’s 
designation of the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument, “plaintiffs 
argued that the action by the Secretary of the Interior could be a final agency 
action, but the court dismissed that claim since the executive branch officers only 
provided recommendations and assistance, not final action, as defined under the 
APA.” Id. 
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10,355,179 which grants the Secretary of the Department of Interior 
authority to exercise the President’s land withdrawal authority and place 
those lands in protected status, means the Secretary has the authority to 
exercise the President’s delegated authority under the Antiquities Act to 
designate national monuments.180 Putting aside the suspect nature of an 
argument that contravenes clear statutory text, the argument seems 
factually “dubious” because since the Order’s promulgation in 1925, the 
President, not the Secretary of the Interior, has designated numerous 
national monuments.181 
c. Violates the National Environmental Policy Act. 
For reasons similar to arguments against the application of the APA 
to the President, namely that the President is not an agency and because 
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) specifically exempts the 
President from its reach, NEPA does not apply to a presidential 
designation.182 Certainly, there may be sound policy reasons to apply 
NEPA to the monument designation process. For example, NEPA 
requires public participation, the input of local information, 
identification of alternatives to monument designation, and a 
demonstration of the costs and benefits of any proposed action. 
However, those reasons cannot justify contradicting statutory design. 
Arguments that it is really a federal agency official that designates a 
national monument because of the pre-designation work that agencies 
do, and that, therefore, NEPA applies, would fail for the same reasons 
they do not work when applied to the APA – namely, that the 
Antiquities Act only authorizes the President to designate national 
monuments. Allowing or even inferring, as is the case here, a sub-
delegation of that authority would contradict the plain language of 
section 431. 
One aim of “constitutional design is to prevent the abuse of 
                                                          
179 Exec. Order No. 10,355, codified at 3 C.F.R. § 873 (1949-1953). 
180 Cannon, supra note 81, at 69-70 (discussing power, elements required to meet it, 
and why transfer is invalid because not approved by Congress). 
181 Id. at 72. 
182 See Harrison, supra note 72, at 427 (challenging Carter’s designation of national 
monuments based on NEPA violation and failing on the grounds that “because the 
President was ‘not a federal agency,’ he was not subject to NEPA's environmental 
impact statement requirements.”). The doctrine of separation of powers also 
counseled against “inferring a Congressional intent to impose such a duty on the 
President.” Iraola, supra note 3, at 182 (quoting Alaska v. Carter, 462 F. Supp. 
1159, 1160 (D. Alaska 1978)). 
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power.”183 Thus, while the legal concerns raised by opponents of the 
Antiquities Act lack merit, underscoring each of them are abuse of 
power concerns. However, largely consistent behavior by the three 
branches of government with respect to protection of national 
monuments for over a century belies these concerns and provides a 
supportive interpretive gloss that prevents a President from contravening 
the Act in a way that would, itself, constitute an abuse of power. 
Congress remains a check on Executive over-reaching, and it is difficult 
to dispute this long history, during which Presidents have designated 
monuments and courts have upheld these designations, which only 
rarely have been changed by Congress.184 
2. Its implementation is undemocratic. 
There may be more traction to criticisms of the Act that it fosters 
undemocratic decision-making because neither the public nor its elected 
officials participate in the designation process. This lack of public 
process conflicts with “fundamental tenets of a participatory 
democracy.”185 Supporters of the Act argue that public participation 
                                                          
183 Vermeule, supra note 85, at 674. Vermeule attributes the increase in executive 
power generally to increasing congressional delegation to the Executive Branch and 
independent agencies, increasing deference by courts to agencies “in a world in 
which Congress has increasingly abdicated its policy responsibilities,” and the 
Executive Branch’s penchant for increasing its own power to act unilaterally, 
exploit “broad and vague delegations of power, vague constitutional powers, and 
traditional pockets of discretion,” as a way of changing policies without getting 
congressional authorization. Id. at 684-85. 
184 Sanders, supra note 9, at 3. 
185 Squillace, supra note 25, at 476; see also Lin, supra note 17, at 739 (“Standard 
rationales for broad-based public involvement in agency decision-making include: 
(1) promoting agency accountability and oversight; (2) reducing the potential for 
agency capture; (3) providing better quality information; and (4) enhancing 
proceduralist goals.”); Ann M. Eisenberg, Do Sagebrush Rebels Have a Colorable 
Claim? The Space Between Parochialism and Exclusion in Federal Land 
Management, 38 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 56, 86 (2017) (“Planners, 
philosophers, and environmental justice theorists agree that ethical norms and legal 
principles support the idea that people’s interest in participatory land use 
decisionmaking transcends formal law.”). Eisenberg also identifies a “reverse 
environmental justice” situation in that “the rhetoric used to justify vast public land 
holdings in the West—that those lands ‘belong to all Americans’—evokes an 
analogous subjugation of local will to “the greater good.” Id. at 85. She suggests a 
“meaningful” collaborative form of decision-making with respect to the 
management of public lands. Id. at 97-100. 
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would make the designation process even more contentious and could 
delay the protection of any qualified sites. They also note that Congress 
has not seen fit to amend the law to make it more transparent even in an 
era where many laws were enacted that included public participation, 
and that the public can participate in the decisions governing the 
management of protected sites at the agency level. 
Public participation in governmental decision-making gives “a voice 
to affected constituencies.”186 This helps assure that government 
officials are better informed about the consequences of their actions, 
thus fostering better decisions.187 “[A] public process can also help 
achieve the virtues of civic republicanism,”188 by focusing on 
deliberation that results in the virtuous political choice, leads to the 
common good and improves the art of citizenship.189 Inviting interested 
members of the public and groups into any governmental process not 
only fosters democratic values, but can “defuse conflicts in a civil 
manner.”190 James Rasband wonders if 
 
aggressive use of the Antiquities Act [is] a repetition of this historical 
pattern of conquest by certitude? Should we be so certain about the 
altruism and correctness of our new preservation preference that we 
eschew any legal obligation to consult with those rural communities 
that have developed real and lasting attachments to the public lands, at 
                                                          
186 Squillace, supra note 25, at 571; see also Lin, supra note 17, at 471 (a rationale 
that “posits that decisions are more likely to be viewed as legitimate if participants’ 
views have been fairly considered,” is likely to be the most relevant to the 
Antiquities Act.) 
187 Squillace, supra note 25, at 571. “While federal agencies may have a reasonable 
grasp of the resources within a monument and the manner in which they might best 
be protected, local officials and members of the public might well have additional 
information regarding the resources that would be valuable in deciding the extent to 
which lands should receive Antiquities Act protection.” Id. at 573. 
188 Id. at 574. 
189 Id. at 576. See generally MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: 
AMERICAN IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996) (discussing the virtues of 
civic republicanism). 
190 Lin, supra note 17, at 742; see also Adrian Vermeule, The Third Bound, 164 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1949, 1960-61 (2016) (commenting that “the ‘civilizing force of 
hypocrisy,’ the inability to give openly partisan justifications in a transparent public 
setting may actually constrain behavior, at least at the edges, if there is no plausible 
public-spirited justification available as a pretext.”). 
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least in part because of their reliance on public policies that 
encouraged that attachment?191  
 
Local accountability is often touted as the reason to favor legislative 
over executive action.192 “Local concerns are voiced by legislators from 
districts containing or dependent on public lands, and are thus less easily 
overlooked or dismissed.”193 To be effective, the public must be 
informed of any pending action so its concerns can be expressed to local 
representatives. But, the Act contains no requirements that the 
communities that host proposed national monuments be informed about 
the pending designation, creating another potential flaw in the statute’s 
structure.  
Another benefit of public participation in the decision-making 
process is that it can lessen the likelihood of agency capture by any 
single interest group. But the President is not a narrowly focused 
agency. The President responds to “a national constituency” unlike 
individual members of Congress, and the American public owns the 
nation’s public lands,194 making capture unlikely.195 In fact, by keeping 
the public out of the designation process, the President is immunized 
from pressure by local interests, enabling him “to make decisions from a 
national perspective.”196  
Those who fret about the lack of public involvement in the 
                                                          
191 James R. Rasband, The Future of the Antiquities Act, 21 J. LAND RESOURCES & 
ENVTL. L. 619, 633 (2001). Rasband’s comment about “conquest with certitude” is 
a reference to Wilkinson’s statement that “the history of the American West has 
been one of ‘conquest by certitude.’” Id. at 633. See also Eisenberg, supra note 
185, at 86-87 (pointing to “communities and individuals’ reliance on the 
longstanding history and continued persistence of the open-access model,” “their 
reliance on the durability of their private claims to public lands,” and their reliance 
“on particular resources and land uses for their livelihoods” as supporting their 
entitlement claims). 
192 Lin, supra note 17, at 736 (“A primary explanation for the preference of 
legislative action is the assumption that congressional land management policy is 
likely to be more responsive to the public interest because members of Congress 
are more readily held accountable.”). 
193 Id. 
194 Id. at 737. 
195 Id. at 740 (“[W]ith respect to agency capture, the risk of Antiquities Act 
authority being ‘captured’ by industry and used inappropriately is minimal . . . 
[and] largely inapplicable to the Presidency.”). Further “an act that provides only 
the authority necessary to protect resources is less useful to industry.” Id. 
196 Id. at 737. 
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designation process and the resulting democracy deficit argue that lack 
of public participation is a primary reason that the Act “should be 
repealed or at least amended to require extensive public review.”197 They 
point to other public land management laws that mandate public 
decision-making, like FLPMA, and suggest their use as a possible model 
for a revised Antiquities Act.198 This concern also lies behind 
suggestions found in many of the bills that followed issuance of the 
Grand Staircase-Escalante proclamation that Congress, as the 
representative body in our system of government, should approve 
monument designations before they become law.199  
However, the Act’s supporters point out that there is sufficient 
informal public participation in the process already—“rarely is a 
national monument created without consultation between the 
Department of the Interior, the White House, Congress, and state and 
local representatives of the affected areas.”200 What’s more, the land-use 
plans that govern management of national monuments undergo 
“extensive public review” under NEPA and land management statutes, 
like FLPMA and the Forest Service Organic Act.201  
Indeed, information gathered through greater participation does not 
automatically lead to more representative decisions. Most participants in 
any planning process will probably represent special interests and will 
speak the loudest because they are likely to have “the most at stake” in 
any outcome, drowning out the less focused views of the general 
                                                          
197 Sanders, supra note 9, at 6; see also Squillace, supra note 25, at 583 (“It is 
hardly surprising that some opponents of the law, recognizing that its repeal is 
unlikely, have pressed to amend the law to include a cumbersome public process. 
They understand that process can be used to delay, obfuscate, weaken, and perhaps 
even defeat new proposals.”). 
198 Sanders, supra note 9, at 5. 
199 Id. See, e.g., S. 437, 114th Cong. (2015) (introduced by Sen. Lisa Murkowski 
(R-AK) requiring an Act of Congress to designate a national monument, approval 
of any states within the boundaries of a national monument—for marine national 
monuments, states and territories within 100 nautical miles of the new monument 
would have to consent to the designation). Maya Kapoor, With more monuments, 
Republican backlash mounts: a proposed bill moves to weaken executive power of 
the Antiquities Act, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Jan. 13, 2017), 
http://www.hcn.org/articles/with-more-monuments-Republican-backlash-
mounts/print_view. 
200 Sanders, supra note 9, at 5. 
201 Id; see also id. at 6 (saying that supporters argue the Antiquities Act is more 
effective without extensive public review, which would hobble one of the few 
environmental laws that work). 
CONVERTDOC.INPUT.593072.DSQ9K (DO NOT DELETE) 1/17/2018  10:44 PM 
140 STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:1 
 
public.202 Moreover, public participation in monument designation could 
make that process unwieldy and cumbersome and actually chill the 
interest in beginning the designation process.203 
In terms of protecting the resource, supporters maintain that the 
President’s representation of “the broad interests” of the American 
public puts them in a better position “to make long term decisions about 
the management of public lands,” than members of Congress and local 
groups with their “narrower constituencies.”204 Saying that since 
Congress is the representational body it is the better decision-maker in 
these circumstances, is not by itself a compelling reason “because public 
land resources necessarily must be managed for the long term.”205  
In any event, Congress can abolish or “shrink” the boundaries of 
national monuments and prevent their designation, as occurred in 
Wyoming and Alaska.206 As an indication of congressional approval of 
the Act and its use to protect important natural resources and structures, 
Congress has converted many national monuments into national 
parks,207 “and has never significantly amended or repealed the 
                                                          
202 Lin, supra note 17, at 741.  
203 Squillace, supra note 25, at 572 (“Because a mandatory public process likely 
would hamper the ability of future Presidents to use the Antiquities Act, adding 
such a process would be a serious mistake.”); see also Jim Rossi, Participation Run 
Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative Agency Decision Making, 
92 NW. U. L. REV. 173, 179-80 (1997) (showing that participation is used 
strategically to delay or to thwart agency programs, and not to engage in 
democratic dialogue); Gail L. Achterman & Sally K. Fairfax, Public Participation 
Requirements of the Federal Land Policy Management Act, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 501, 
508 (1979) (“Moreover, ‘public involvement programs . . . may easily mobilize 
dissent’ and heighten polarization, public frustration, and dissatisfaction”).  
204 Sanders, supra note 9, at 6; see Lin, supra note 17, at 740 (“[W]ith respect to 
accountability, the President is already directly accountable to majoritarian political 
processes.”); id. at 746 (“[T]he President's distinction as the one leader elected by 
all the American people places him in a unique position to exercise long-term and 
broad-scale judgments regarding the national and historical significance of public 
lands.”). This also makes the president accountable to the entire American public, 
not just those who inhabit a member’s district or state. 
205 Squillace, supra note 25, at 573-74. 
206 Sanders, supra note 9, at 7.  
207 See Lin, supra note 17, at 744 (“Congress has arguably recognized and endorsed 
prior executives' farsighted and decisive wielding of Antiquities Act authority when 
it converted numerous monuments to national parks.”); see also Sanders, supra 
note 9, at 7 (“expressing anything but disapproval for how the Antiquities Act has 
been implemented, Congress has turned many national monuments into national 
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Antiquities Act, including in 1976 when it overhauled how the majority 
of federal public lands were managed in FLPMA.”208 In fact, it 
reaffirmed the importance of the Act in section 204(j). 
Rasband characterizes the Antiquities Act “as a ‘gadget’ that 
‘devalues the ennobling qualities of a fair and democratic preservation 
process’ by circumventing the more difficult process of crafting 
successful legislation.”209 Lin counters by saying “[t]he fact that both the 
executive and legislative branches can exercise a similar power, 
however, does not make the exercise by the former less democratic per 
se, as long as that power has been democratically delegated and is 
subject to democratic control.”210 He adds the congressional 
acquiescence in the broad use of the Act’s authority creates an inference 
of such delegation and control.211 According to Lin, “[i]n light of 
Congress’ express and legitimate delegation of authority through the 
Antiquities Act, the effectiveness of Congress’ checks on that authority, 
and the political accountability of the wielder of that authority, the Act is 
prima facie consistent with democratic principles.”212 
Lin argues that the Antiquities Act “does not pose a serious threat to 
the foundations of our democratic system,” and neither the concerns of 
the “centralists,” who worry about power concentration, or the 
“decentralists” who worry about power diffusion, “are seriously at 
issue.”213 “Land withdrawn pursuant to the Act is essentially put in trust. 
The means of protecting the land is both coercive and democratic-
coercive because decisions are made in the absence of consensus and 
perhaps without exhaustive public input; democratic because of the 
multiple checks that ultimately provide accountability.”214 The Act’s 
structure, thus, enables the popularly elected leader of the country “to 
                                                                                                                                       
parks”). Today, lands that were initially withdrawn under the Antiquities Act 
“comprise more than 50 percent of the total acreage” in the national park system. 
208 Sanders, supra note 9, at 7; see also Lin, supra note 17, at 731 
(“Notwithstanding the expansive use of the Act's authority, Congress has 
repeatedly considered and rejected proposals to repeal or modify it.”). 
209 Lin, supra note 17, at 730 (quoting Rasband, supra note 191, at 533). 
210 Lin, supra note 17, at 731. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. at 730. 
213 Id. at 744. 
214 Id. (“‘[M]utual coercion, mutually agreed upon by the majority of the people 
affected,’ in its simplest form suggests an agreement among resource users to limit 
use of a resource to protect it for continued future uses.”) (quoting WILLIAM 
OPHULS, ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARY, 150-51 (1977). 
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make resource-protective decisions subject to further debate and 
disposition by the people’s elected representatives in Congress,”215 
should they want to.  
Still, on balance, the exclusion of the public from the Act’s formal 
decision-making process is troubling and may resonate with a less 
conservation-oriented Congress in the future, as is the case with the 
current Congress. Whether informal public outreach, as was the case in 
the designation of Bears Ears, will be sufficient to counter complaints 
about the Act’s democracy deficit remains to be seen, as the final 
chapter on that designation has yet to be written. 
3. The Act destabilizes local expectations and fosters anti-federal 
government feelings. 
a.  A landscape in transition and a history of anti-government 
movements. 
Many factors have made the Intermountain Western parts of the 
country unique, not the least of which is the dominant presence of the 
federal government. The federal government owns forty-seven percent 
of the land in eleven western states; up to sixty-five percent in Utah--the 
site of Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monuments--
and eighty-five percent in Nevada.216 Out of 157 national monuments 
designated by Presidents, all but nineteen of them are located west of the 
100th meridian, and sixty-four, nearly half of the total number of 
designated monuments can be found in the Intermountain Western 
states.217 Opponents view designation of national monuments as a 
federal land grab,218 even though the federal government already owns 
the designated lands, so the government is actually grabbing its own 
land.219 And, national monuments cannot be made of private or state-
                                                          
215 Id. at 746.  
216 Sanders, supra note 9, at 3. Nationally, the federal government only owns 28% 
of the land. Id. 
217 Ranchod, supra note 10, at app. A at 585-88.  
218 Sellars, supra note 8, at 295 (“[C]ritics of the Antiquities Act believed that the 
monuments could take even more of the public domain out of the reach of private 
ownership or use.”). The concern about locking up public lands was raised during 
debates on the original statute and is anything but a modern plaint. 
219 Lin, supra note 17, at 722 (“There was little substance to the ‘land grab’ 
charges, as the land in question already belonged to the federal government and 
was therefore subject to disposition under the Property Clause.”). 
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owned lands; only pre-existing federal lands.220  
Whether it’s federal ownership of western lands or the intrusive 
shadow of federal rules and regulations backed by the omnipotent 
federal enforcement officer, westerners generally unite in their 
opposition to the federal government.221 But the character of the western 
landscape is changing catching rural communities “between powerful 
forces of change.”222  
In the West, “traditional economies are in decline, creating hardship, 
dislocation, and no small amount of desperation among long-time 
residents.”223 The “economic dislocation” this part of the country is 
experiencing is “‘more widespread [and] more persistent’ then it has 
been in the past.”224 Changes in the national economy have put “small, 
marginally successful users of public resources,” like ranchers, at a 
competitive disadvantage with larger, diversified corporations, shifting 
“the economies of many western states” away from these businesses 
toward recreation and tourism.225 “Recent world economic trends do not 
                                                          
220 Arnold & Porter, supra note 12, at 2. There can be exceptions to this where 
private or local land is donated to the federal government. See id. at 9 (in 
possession of author) (discussing the designation of the Mount Katahdin Woods 
and Waters National Monument on lands donated by the owner of Burt’s Bees, and 
saying “[o]ther National Monuments established under the Antiquities Act stand on 
a different footing because they were established in concert with a city, State or 
private citizen or organization which owned the land and gave it to the federal 
government on the condition that it be included in a National Monument. If such a 
Monument designation were revoked, one can only imagine the chaos that would 
result, at least absent federal legislation, in terms of the disposition of the land and 
rights so contributed. But only Congress has the power to do so.”). 
221 Rasband, supra note 191, at 857-58 (quoting Bruce Babbitt, Federalism & the 
Environment: An Intergovernmental Perspective of the Sagebrush Rebellion, 12 
ENVTL. L. 847, 857-58 (1982) (“What angers most westerners is not the fact of 
federal ownership, but the federal government's insistence that it is entitled to 
exercise power ‘without limitation.’ When this sovereign power is wielded by a 
continually changing parade of federal administrators, each with a different agenda, 
the situation becomes intolerable.”). 
222 Bill Hedden, The Monument in a Changing West, 21 J. LAND RESOURCES & 
ENVTL. L. 535, 535 (2001). 
223 Id. 
224 Robert L. Glicksman, Fear and Loathing on Federal Lands, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 
647, 665 (1997). 
225 Id.; see also HEADWATERS ECONOMICS, supra note 157, at 1 (reporting that 44% 
of total private wage and salary employment, the equivalent of 1,630 jobs, were 
associated with travel and tourism in Utah and that, according to the Outdoor 
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favor family ranching. Declining per capita beef consumption, overseas 
competition, and consolidation of packing houses have driven beef 
prices down at the same time that ranchers, who depend on federal 
grazing leases, face an increasingly complex regulatory environment 
that raises operating costs and increases uncertainty.”226 Indeed, long 
before designation of the Grand Staircase-Escalante National 
Monument. Traditional jobs like agriculture, mining, and timber “were 
becoming a smaller share of the overall economy, but they held steady 
after the monument’s designation.”227 
Today, government services, mining, and construction are the 
principal income-producers in San Juan County, the location of the 
controversial Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante national 
monuments. 228 The federal government is still the top employer in the 
country,229 which is not surprising as the federal government owns 60% 
of the land in the county.230 The public reaction to the recent designation 
of these two monuments in the county may reflect “a new reality in 
which the economic benefits of recreation on the public lands exceed 
economic benefits of alternative uses.”231 Illustrating this change, a 
January 2017 poll of Utah residents showed that sixty percent of 
respondents wanted the designations to remain and that ninety-five 
percent recognized that opportunities for outdoor recreation at national 
parks in Utah were a “boon” to the state, in 2015 generating nearly $850 
million per year in visitor spending and creating 14,000 jobs that paid 
$435 million.232  
                                                                                                                                       
Industry Association, recreation contributes more that $12 billion annually to the 
state’s economy). 
226 Hedden, supra note 222, at 539; see also Glicksman, supra note 224, at 665 
(“The West, surprisingly, is now the most urbanized scion of the country, and 
traditional industries such as farming, mining, ranching, and logging contribute less 
to state economies than they used to.”). 
227 HEADWATERS ECONOMICS, supra note 157, at 12. 
228 Julie Turkevitz, A Vast Divide: Fight Intensifies as Trump Rethinks Monument 
Status for Utah Expanse, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2017, at A11; see also Headwaters 
Economics, supra note 157, at 1 (service jobs in the Grand Staircase-Escalante 
region “account for the majority of employment growth”); see also id. (from 2001-
2015 in that region, population grew by 13%, jobs by 24%, real personal income by 
32%, and real per capita income by 17%). 
229 Hedden, supra note 222, at 537. 
230 Turkevitz, supra note 228, at A11. 
231 Lin, supra note 17, at 724. 
232 Darryl Fears, Bears Ears is a national monument now. But it will take a fight to 
save it, WASHINGTON POST, Mar 23, 2017, 
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But a shifting regional economy has not caught up with the anti-
federal government feelings of the residents, and indeed may be 
provoking them. “Rebelling against government has been in the hearts 
of the ordinary American citizens ever since Colonial days,”233 and in no 
place is that more true than the Intermountain West perhaps because of 
these changes to the area’s economic and social equilibrium.234 The area 
has gone through a succession of anti-federal government movements, 
like the Sagebrush Rebellion,235 the Wise Use Movement,236 and now 
the County Supremacy Movement.  
The Wise Use Movement focused on the threats posed to western 
communities by environmentalists and the need for stronger protection 
of private property rights. “Their goal, like that of the Sagebrush Rebels 
before them, was the transfer of undeveloped western federal lands to 
the private sector for commercial exploitation.”237 The County 
Supremacy Movement, the latest iteration of the Sagebrush Rebellion, 
“was born in Catron County, New Mexico, which in 1991 passed the 
                                                                                                                                       
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/bears-ears-is-a-national-monument-now-
but-it-will-take-a-fight-to-save-it (noting the importance of the $1.3 billion 
economic impact of parks and monuments, during the 2013 government shutdown, 
the state “paid the Park Service to keep them open.”).  
233 Reed, supra note 127, at 530. 
234 Glicksman, supra note 224, at 665 (historian Eric Hobsbawm describes a 
particular form of rural social unrest, which he calls social banditry, as ‘most likely 
to become a major phenomenon when the . . . social equilibrium is upset: during 
and after periods of abnormal hardship, such as famines and wars, or at the 
moments when the jaws of the dynamic modem world seize the static communities 
in order to destroy and transform them.’”). 
235 Id. at 652 (“The forerunner of the claims by the officials of Nye County, Nevada 
and Garfield County, Utah that they had the right to control activities on the federal 
lands was the Sagebrush Rebellion of the mid-1970s. Led by western ranching 
interests opposed to increased federal land use regulation, the rebels sought the 
transfer of title to millions of acres of federal lands to the states containing them . . . 
by the mid-1980s, the rebellion had fizzled out.”). See Eisenberg, supra note 185, 
at 63 n.34 (quoting former Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt as saying “It is easy to 
dismiss the motives of the small group of stockmen and their political allies who 
have revived the rallying cry of states’ rights for their own benefit. But the 
considerable support that the Sagebrush Rebellion has gained in the West reflects a 
deep-seated frustration with what is perceived to be heavy-handed, arbitrary, and 
unreasonable federal regulation of public lands.”). 
236 Glicksman, supra note 224, at 653 (“The successor to the Sagebrush Rebellion 
was the Wise Use Movement, born around 1988 in reaction to the increased 
emphasis placed on preservation of federal lands and resources.”). 
237 Id. at 653. 
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first so-called ‘custom and culture’ ordinance.”238 Supporters of these 
ordinances maintain that their intent is to foster “the ‘American tradition 
of self-government’ by reducing bureaucracy and increasing economic 
stability.”239 Glicksman maintains that once the rhetoric of the County 
Supremacy movement and its focus on culture and custom is “stripped 
away,” the movement is all about rejecting change and maintaining 
“traditional access rights and prerogatives.”240 Regardless of how these 
groups self-describe, “it is difficult to distinguish the objective sought in 
Catron County from the nullification, not of all federal laws, but of those 
federal policies plans and practices related to land, water and wildlife 
which were not to the liking of the county government.”241 
The County Supremacy Movement, like its predecessor movements, 
is built on myth. There are no laws at the federal or even state level 
requiring deference to custom and culture, despite the passage of 
“custom and culture” ordinances, discussed above. As Reed says, the 
theory “teeters upon the slenderest of reeds”242 Reed adds that “[t]he 
county supremacy ordinances have the durability of cow chips,” and the 
concept of county supremacy is little more than “a gaseous myth,” to 
which westerners seem to be especially susceptible.243 But that does not 
                                                          
238 Id. at 654; see also id. at 656 (“The Kleppe decision [Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 
U.S. 529 (1976)] should have put an end to the spurious notion that state or local 
governments have the right to dictate how the federal government may use and 
restrict its own lands. But the County Supremacists and their ideological kindred 
continue to press their claims which, despite refinements, still fly in the face of 
precedent.”).  
239 Id. at 660. But see Reed, supra note 127 (quoting Bill Welsch of Lewiston, in 
Trinity County in northern California, as saying that “an honest search to discover 
the local custom and culture would produce something different: ‘The custom of 
our past is to seize land by force from the natives, plunder the resources using slave 
and child labor, wash away land with hydraulic mining and clear-cut virgin 
forests.’”). 
240 Glicksman, supra note 224, at 666. Reporting on the comments by a senior 
fellow at the Cato Institute, a conservative think tank located in Washington, D.C., 
Glicksman says he described the supporters of the County Supremacy Movement 
as wanting to do is “build walls against the future.” Id. Glicksman identifies 
another “prominent theme in the recent movement to reform environmental 
policy,” namely that federal regulatory authority infringes of private property 
rights. Id. at 660. But see Eisenberg, supra note 185, at 65 (identifying three 
“colorable claims” made by these groups “justifying local outrage”). 
241 Reed, supra note 127, at 543. 
242 Id. at 526. 
243 Id. 
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matter to its participants; according to Reed, “it is folly to underestimate 
the political power of myths.”244  
One striking aspect of the County Supremacy movement that 
separates it from the groups that preceded it is the strength of the 
hostility to the federal presence and a “willingness” to resort to extreme, 
sometimes violent behavior, an attitude that has not yet infected the 
debates about reforming pollution control laws.245 This violence, 
Glicksman says, is attributable to another unique feature of western 
culture, “the tradition of lawlessness in the West,” a tradition based in 
part on reality and in part on “myth.”246 “Diatribes” like those emanating 
from a Congresswoman from Wyoming, that the West was not settled by 
“wimps and faint-hearted people,”247 “have been enthusiastically 
received in some corners of the West because of a combination of 
resentment over the disappearance of longstanding traditions and 
practices and fear of what the future will bring.”248 In this mix of anger 
and anxiety, the federal government becomes “a convenient scapegoat” 
for the repressed frustrations of a regional population undergoing 
unwanted and destabilizing change.249 
Another important strand of western thinking that plays into these 
movements is the “tradition of subjugating nature,”250 which has 
encouraged the building of dams, making money and “packing in more 
people,” regardless of the environmental and societal costs. At “a very 
deep level,” conflicts over monument designations, like Grand Staircase-
Escalante and Bears Ears, “are rooted in the divergent moral and cultural 
values that generate differing views of the relationship between humans 
and nature.”251 Hence, the withdrawal of lands that have traditionally 
                                                          
244 Id. 
245 Glicksman, supra note 224, at 661. Glicksman cites as an example of this 
President Clinton and Interior Secretary Babbitt being burned in effigy. Id at 666. 
246 Id. at 661. 
247 141 CONG. REC. H8789, H8790 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1995 (remarks of Rep. 
Chenoweth)), quoted in Glicksman, supra note 224, at 664. 
248 Glicksman, supra note 224, at 664. 
249 Id. 
250 Id. at 663 (attributing these thoughts to DONALD WORSTER, UNDER WESTERN 
SKIES: NATURE AND HISTORY IN THE AMERICAN WEST 90 (1992)). 
251 Sarah Trainor, Finding Common Ground: Moral Values and Cultural Identify in 
Early Conflict Over the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument, 28 J. 
LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 331, 355 (2008); see also id. at 354 (“We have seen 
how for each group: the Southern Paiute, descendants of Mormon pioneers, and 
wilderness advocates, moral and cultural values of the landscape constitute an 
integral part of the identity of group members, both individually and collectively. 
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been exploited for mining, oil and gas development, and grazing is 
unfathomable to traditionalists in the west and deeply threatening to 
established ways of living. 
Traditions and engrained attitudes die hard and in the designation of 
national monuments have found an opportune target.  
 
There is a stream, that sometimes widens into a river, flowing through 
our history from the Whiskey Rebellion through the Know Nothing 
movement to the Populists to Ross Perot. The best government is the 
least government. The next best government is local government. 
Those people back there don’t understand our territory or our ways.252 
 
In 2012, for example, Utah passed a law demanding that the federal 
government hand over thirty-one million acres of federal lands, and the 
state is ready to go to court if the government does not accede to the 
demand.253 “Thirty-six similar bills have been introduced in 10 other 
western states during the current legislative cycle.”254 As Sanders notes, 
one “can dismiss the Oregon standoff as fringe activism, and the land 
transfer movement as wishful thinking, but they are emblematic of a 
long-running and very real debate over the proper role of the federal 
                                                                                                                                       
Yet, each group has a different cultural and moral narrative for the relationship 
between humans and nature.”); id. at 355 (The conflict over monument 
designations “is incomplete and oversimplified when characterized as conflict over 
jobs versus nature or over private versus public rights to access.”). 
252 Reed, supra note 127, at 530; see also id. at 530 (“Even in times of very popular 
presidents . . . there have always been strident dissenters complaining about the 
federal government.”). 
253 Sanders, supra note 9, at 3. Ironically, Utah has the strongest support for 
federal-state collaborative efforts of any state in the Intermountain West, “with 
respondents favoring collaboration outnumbering those who favor a ‘no 
compromise’ approach by an eleven to one margin.” John C. Ruoke & Robert B. 
Keiter, Alternatives to the Transfer of Public Lands Act, S.J. Quinney College of 
Law, RES. PAPER No. 157 (March 1, 2016), at 9. 
254 Sanders, supra note 9, at 3. Eight members of Congress who introduced 
legislation this session to weaken public lands protections also received “hefty 
campaign contributions from powerful players in extractive industries, such as 
Koch Industries and Chevron.” Rebecca Worby et al., Eight Lawmakers Whose 
Bills Attack Public Lands, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, June 10, 2017, at 1, 
http://www.hcn.org/issues/49.10/the-western-lawmakers-whose-bills-attack-public-
lands/print_view. However, retiring senator Jason Chaffetz (R. Utah) withdrew his 
bill to sell 3.3 million acres of public lands in Utah in response to “backlash” from 
his constituents. Id. 
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government in owning and managing American lands.”255 Many of the 
earlier advocates of transferring federal land to the states have shifted 
their efforts to nullifying national monuments and restricting presidential 
authority under the Antiquities Act; Bears Ears has become the 
flashpoint of that debate.256 
b. The destabilizing impact of monument designation on host 
communities. 
Monument designations disrupt the expectations of people who are 
used to using public lands as though they, and not the American people, 
owned them.257 They worry that the withdrawal of lands into a more 
protected status will curtail largely unregulated uses of these lands for 
recreation as well as grazing and extractive activities, thus changing how 
people are accustomed to conducting their lives. They fear economic 
harm to individuals, local communities, and the state.258 Designation 
                                                          
255 Sanders, supra note 9, at 3; see also id. (“The Malheur standoff and the state 
land transfer movement will join the Sagebrush Rebellion of the 1970s and 1980s, 
and the ‘wise use’ movement of the 1980s and 1990s, as manifestations of the 
fractious dispute among ranchers, loggers, miners, private property activists, 
conservationists, federal land managers, and others about how best to manage our 
nation’s federal public lands.”); Eisenberg, supra note 185, at 56 (“supporters 
of . . . the Movement to Transfer Public Lands, encompassing such sub-movements 
as the Sagebrush Rebellion, the Wise Use Movement, and the County Supremacy 
Move—all maintain some version of the narrative that federal ownership is illegal 
or mismanaged, and thus the land should be transferred to the states or counties, or 
privatized outright.”). 
256 Tay Wiles, Land transfer advocates steer their focus to monuments: A transfer 
movement moves to rescind monuments and weaken the Antiquities Act, HIGH 
COUNTRY NEWS (Apr. 12, 2017), at 1, http://www.hcn.org/articles/Public-land-
transfer-advocates-target-national-monuments-bears-ears/print_view. Six Western 
states, including Utah, have pending resolutions or bills to revoke or shrink the size 
of national monuments. Id. at 2. Sen. Dean Heller of Nevada sponsored the Nevada 
Land Sovereignty Act, which would prevent future presidents from using the 
Antiquities Act to designate monuments in that state. Id. at 3. Utah Governor 
Herbert’s resolution would rescind Bears Ears and urge Congress to shrink Grand 
Staircase-Escalante. There is also a counter-movement among environmentalists 
and sportsmen, which may have been responsible for Nevada legislators discussing 
a bill to support the Antiquities Act and the Gold Butte and Great Basin National 
Monuments. Id. at 4  
257 Lin, supra note 17, at 722. 
258 See Lin, supra note 17, at 724 (“Nevertheless, even if effects on such interests 
ultimately do not give rise to takings, the monument designations admittedly have 
adverse economic impacts on certain users of the federal lands.”); Sanders, supra 
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could result in an emigration of residents who can no longer make a 
living in the area or who cannot afford the higher taxes which may 
accompany increased property values, and greater need for public 
service like law enforcement or search and rescue units. Existing 
residents worry that the influx of tourists and new businesses drawn to 
the area by the new monuments will demand non-traditional skills, like 
those associated with service and hospitality industries, and will destroy 
the rural character that has defined the area and its population for 
generations.259 
But fears about discontinuation of traditional uses of lands within 
the boundaries of a national monument are not well founded. These 
lands are subject to management standards, which can allow most of 
these existing uses to go forward.260 National Parks, monuments, and 
other protected areas attract visitors, who spend money in the 
surrounding communities;261 money that will support new schools and 
additional public service obligations.262 Right before President Clinton 
designated Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument in 1996, 47% 
of Utahans opposed its creation.”263 Half a year later, that number had 
sunk to 32%.264 A year after the designation, “the number of tourists 
stopping by the visitor center had jumped by 58%, and ten years later, 
they and the monument’s 430 full-time jobs were contributing at least 
$26 million to the local economy.”265  
                                                                                                                                       
note 9, at 6 (“Regarding economic impacts, critics contend that monuments, by 
restricting allowable uses, destroy long-established enterprises on public lands. The 
effects can be especially severe in the remote places in the West where most 
monuments are created and job opportunities are few. President Clinton’s 1996 
Grand Staircase-Escalante Monument sequestered what was then the largest 
undeveloped coal deposit in the United States, while the national monument 
reportedly being considered for the Owyhee Canyonlands (which helped precipitate 
the recent standoff at the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge in Oregon) could close 
nearly 2.5 million acres to cattle grazing.”). 
259 Lin, supra note 17, at 724-25. 
260 Squillace, supra note 25, at 573-74 (noting that valid existing rights and 
proclamations that allow new land uses, even extractive ones to continue means 
that “the temporary protection of these lands and resources in a national monument 
preserves, rather than limits, the options available to the Congress in deciding on 
the long-term management of those lands.”). 
261 Sanders, supra note 9, at 6. 
262 See e.g., HEADWATERS ECONOMICS, supra note 152 at 26 n.160. 
263 Sanders, supra note 9, at 6. 
264 Id. 
265 Id. 
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Thus, national monuments “don’t kill local economies and jobs so 
much as transform them”266 from traditional uses to new ones and help 
preserve the existing landscape. As Alan Simpson, a longtime 
Republican Senator from Wyoming, said about the Jackson Hole 
National Monument: 
 
All of us [those who now live in Jackson Hole] agree that Teton 
County would not look like it does today if they hadn’t (established the 
monument and expanded the park). Instead of open space there would 
be gas stations, motels and other businesses on Antelope Flats north of 
Jackson where the view of the Tetons remains largely unobstructed by 
development. It was great in hindsight.267 
 
But that transformation is part of the problem for traditionalists, 
which has found new voice in response to recent designations of 
national monuments.  
This Part has shown how little merit there is to the arguments raised 
by opponents of the Antiquities Act and of specific monument 
designations like Bears Ears and Grand Staircase Escalante. Legal 
plaints against the statute under the Property Clause, the APA, and 
NEPA have little merit, and while the law is short on public 
participation, Congress has seen fit not to amend it to correct this 
democracy deficit. In fact, more process and public participation might 
hinder future designations, thus undermining the Act’s purpose.  
Finally, fears that designation of national monuments would 
negatively affect the economies of host communities turns out not to be 
true—quite the contrary, those economies improve post-designation. 
What is true, however, is that these designations are occurring during a 
time and in a part of the country where change is already occurring, and 
that itself is destabilizing and a source of animosity to the federal 
government as well as to federal lands, including national monuments. 
The next Part discusses a sitting President’s authority to revoke, directly 
or indirectly, a prior President’s designation of a national monument. 
                                                          
266 Id.  
267 Squillace, supra note 25, at 498 n.159 (quoting former Senator Alan K. 
Simpson, previously a strident opponent to the Jackson Hole National Monument). 
As another indication of the monument’s contribution to local life and the area’s 
economy, Congress made it into a National Park in 1950. Leshy & Squillace, supra 
note 8, at A23. 
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IV. NEITHER THE TEXT OF THE ANTIQUITIES ACT NOR INTERPRETIVE 
CANONS AUTHORIZE A PRESIDENT DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY TO 
REVOKE OR AMEND A PRIOR PRESIDENT’S DESIGNATION OF A 
NATIONAL MONUMENT  
What counts as an abuse of executive discretion, and how best to try to 
prevent those abuses through law, extralegal norms, or politics, will 
remain among the most pressing questions at the center of 
constitutional governance in the United States.268 
 
The previous Part of the article looked at arguments opposing and 
supporting the Antiquities Act and concerns the designation of a national 
monument creates in a host community. This Part examines the 
authority of a President to override a decision of a prior President to 
designate a national monument when he does not like that decision. 
Some say this authority inheres within the general powers of the 
President; others disagree. Like any question involving a statute and 
authority delegated under it,269 the answers, if they can be found, lie in 
statutory text, as elucidated by canons of statutory interpretation, the 
Act’s legislative history, and the text’s application by others, including 
subsequent congressional action. It is to these analytical tools the Article 
now turns to answer the Part’s question. 
Since prior sections of the article have discussed the Act’s 
legislative history, its application by prior Presidents, and how courts 
have interpreted it, this section will focus on the statutory text and its 
reaffirmation in FLPMA, on whether the President might have an 
implied power to affect a national monument, and on canons of statutory 
interpretation. The Part concludes that only Congress has the power to 
affect a previously designated national monument, and that all contrary 
conclusions based on statutory text, interpretive canons, and implied 
powers fail to support the President having this power. To cede to 
Presidents this power in defiance of statutory text would defy norms of 
separation of powers and delegated authority, as discussed in the last 
Part of the Article.  
A.  Section 204(j) of FLPMA Reaffirmed the Textual Clarity of Section 
                                                          
268 Coglianese & Yoo, supra note 162, at 1606. 
269 Arnold & Porter, supra note 12, at 1 (“Whether or not the President has the 
power unilaterally to revoke a National Monument designation therefore depends 
on whether that power is expressly or by implication delegated to the President by 
an Act of Congress.”). 
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431 of the Antiquities Act that Only Congress Can Rescind a National 
Monument or Modify its Boundaries 
The statutory text of section 431 of the Antiquities Act gives the 
President only the power to identify and then protect historical and pre-
historical structures and objects of scientific interest. The Act gives no 
authority to the President to rescind or “de-designate” a designated 
national monument, shrink its boundaries, or change any conditions in 
the designation proclamation. Those powers to revoke or amend a 
presidential designation reside only in Congress and implicitly in the 
courts, if the Presidential designation violates the Act in some way. No 
judicial decision could be found authorizing a President to do either,270 
and no canon of statutory interpretation or other interpretive trope can 
force a contrary meaning to the text. 
Congress affirmed its authority to revoke or modify national 
monuments in the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) 
(1976).271 FLPMA was preceded by a 1964 congressional commission 
which recommended that “large scale withdrawals and reservations for 
the purpose [among other things] of establishing or enlarging” national 
monuments “should be reserved to congressional action.”272 The House 
Report on FLPMA “made clear that . . . [i]t would also specially reserve 
to the Congress the authority to modify and revoke withdrawals for 
national monuments created under the Antiquities Act . . . . These 
provisions will insure that the integrity of the great national resource 
management systems will remain under the control of the Congress.”273 
The House Committee Report, thus, specifically reiterated that only 
                                                          
270 BALDWIN, supra note 22, at 3 (“We have found no cases deciding the issue of 
the authority of a President to revoke a national monument. While in FLPMA 
Congress expressly limited the authority of the Secretary of the Interior to revoke 
monument withdrawals and reservations, that language arguably does not affect the 
President's authority under the 1906 Act, which FLPMA neither amended nor 
repealed. No President has ever revoked a previously established monument. That a 
President can modify a previous Presidentially-created monument seems clear. 
However, there is no language in the 1906 Act that expressly authorizes revocation; 
there is no instance of past practice in that regard, and there is an attorney general's 
opinion concluding that the President lacks that authority.”). 
271“Establishing Public Land Policy; Establishing Guidelines for its Administration; 
Providing for the Management, Protection, Development, and Enhancement of the 
Public Lands; and For Other Purposes,” H. R. REP. 94-1163 (1976) (hereafter the 
“House Report”) at 9. 
272 Arnold & Porter, supra note 12, at 4 (quoting Commission report). 
273 Id. at 6 (quoting House Report, at 9). 
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Congress had “the authority to modify and revoke withdrawals for 
national monuments under the Antiquities Act.”274 
FLPMA repealed most of the President and Secretary of Interior’s 
land withdrawal authority275 and subjected future withdrawals to 
additional congressional scrutiny and approval.276 “FLPMA additionally 
repealed the implied general withdrawal authority that had been 
recognized by the Supreme Court in United States v. Midwest Oil.”277 
Amidst all this repealing and cabining of Secretarial withdrawal 
authority, FLPMA specified in section 204(j) that the Secretary of 
Interior “could not make, modify, or revoke any withdrawal created by 
Act of Congress or ‘modify or revoke any withdrawal creating national 
monuments under the Act of June 8, 1906 (34 Stat. 225; 16 U.S.C. 431-
433).”278  
While section 204(j) refers to the Secretary’s authority to withdraw 
land and not the President, “the breadth of the committee report 
language” supporting the legislation indicates that Congress could have 
thought that preventing the Secretary from affecting any previously 
designated national monument would, in effect, control a President from 
doing the same thing.279 “Whether this is a fair reading of FLPMA and 
                                                          
274 Id. at 1-2.  
275 Lin, supra note 17, at 710 (“The 1976 passage of the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act (FLPMA) drastically curbed and modified the executive branch's 
withdrawal authority. FLPMA repealed all or part of twenty-nine statutes that had 
given the President authority to create, modify, or terminate withdrawals for such 
purposes as reclamation, native purposes, power site reserves, town sites, stock 
driveways, and public water reserves.”). 
276 BALDWIN, supra note 22, at 2; see also 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c) (2014). 
277 Lin, supra note 17, at 710 (commenting in addition Congress noted that this 
implied authority was the main authority that the executive branch had used to 
make withdrawals). 
278 43 U.S.C. § 1714(j) (2014). Section 204(j) also prohibited the Secretary to 
“make, modify or revoke any withdrawal created by Act of Congress” or “modify 
or revoke any withdrawal which added lands to the National Wildlife Refuge 
System” prior to the enactment date of FLPMA; see also BALDWIN, supra note 21, 
at 2. According to Baldwin, this “provision came from the House bill, H.R. 13777, 
as introduced and as reported. The relevant committee report states: ‘[the bill] 
would also specifically reserve to Congress the authority to modify and revoke 
withdrawals for national monuments created under the Antiquities Act . . . These 
provisions will insure that the integrity of the great national resource management 
systems will remain under the control of the Congress.’” Id. at 4. 
279 BALDWIN, supra note 22, at 5 (one might “argue that the general controls in 
FLPMA over large withdrawals made by the Secretary were also intended to 
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whether controlling withdrawals or revocations made by the Secretary 
effectively controls the President under the Antiquities Act are issues 
that are not clear.”280 What is clear is that although FLPMA gave the 
Secretary of the Interior some authority to withdraw public lands, it 
specifically stated that he could not revoke or modify in any way a 
previously designated national monument under the Antiquities Act.281  
In section 204(c) of FLPMA, Congress reasserted its control over 
withdrawals and reservations of public lands and limited actions that 
could be taken by the President or by his surrogate the Secretary of the 
Interior with respect to those lands.282 It did this by requiring 
congressional approval of large land withdrawals and repealing earlier 
laws, which gave that authority to the President. In section 204(f), 
Congress repealed the President’s authority “to make withdrawals 
implied by the acquiescence of Congress in the actions of previous 
Presidents.”283 However, amidst all of this taking back of Presidential 
power over the nation’s lands, Congress in FLPMA “conspicuously” 
retained the President’s authority under the Antiquities Act to designate 
national monuments and withdraw land necessary for their maintenance, 
without any explanation of why it made that decision, implying some 
                                                                                                                                       
control withdrawals made by the President under the 1906 Act.”); see also 
Squillace et al., supra note 5, at 60-64 (discussing the legislative history of § 204(j) 
making it clear that only Congress possesses the authority to revoke or “downsize” 
a national monument).  
280 BALDWIN, supra note 22, at 3. Brown argues against construing this report 
language as repealing the authority of the President to make large scale withdrawals 
“because courts are reluctant to find statutes repealed by implication and this would 
seem especially true of a statute that so carefully and extensively repealed or 
modified so many other acts, but did not amend or repeal the Antiquities Act.” Id. 
Indeed, uncodified section 701 (a) of FLPMA expressly states that the Act should 
not be construed to repeal any existing law by implication, and Presidents have 
created large-acreage monuments since enactment of FLPMA.” Id. 
281Arnold & Porter, supra note 12, at 6 citing 43 U.S.C. § 1714; see also BALDWIN, 
supra note 21, at 3 (quoting the report as saying “[the bill] would also specifically 
reserve to Congress the authority to modify and revoke withdrawals for national 
monuments created under the Antiquities Act . . . These provisions will insure that 
the integrity of the great national resource management systems will remain under 
the control of the Congress.”). 
282 BALDWIN, supra note 22, at 3; see also Lin, supra note 17, at 711 (“FLPMA 
provided to the Secretary of the Interior a new, more limited withdrawal authority 
and subjected it to congressional veto and other procedural restrictions. This 
authority cannot be used to modify or revoke a withdrawal previously made by 
Congress, or to make withdrawals ‘which can be made only by Act of Congress.’”). 
283 See Sec. 304(f), 43 U.S.C. §1714(f); see also BALDWIN, supra note 22, at 3. 
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obviousness to the choice.284  
B. Interpretive Canons and Other Forms of Guidance on Statutory 
Meaning Are Either Irrelevant or Confirm a Limited View of 
Presidential Authority under the Act 
“[T]he body of the law should make sense, and . . . it is the 
responsibility of courts, within the permissible meanings of the text, to 
make it so.”285 Toward this end, when there is textual ambiguity, courts 
often use interpretive canons or other rules to help clarify statutory 
meaning. Canons are basically “interpretive principles” judges use when 
faced with ambiguous statutory text.286 Despite some unease with their 
use,287 canons and interpretive principles are easy for judges to apply 
and help assure some coherence and consistency in judicial decision 
making.288 In addition to canons, courts use presumptions and legislative 
history to help “resolve statutory ambiguity.”289  
Gluck and Bressman divide interpretive canons into three groups: 
(1) “‘textual canons,’ which are default rules about how text is drafted,” 
like noscitur a sociis; (2) “‘substantive canons,’ which are policy-based 
presumptions,” like Chevron deference; and (3) “‘extrinsic canons,’ 
which are outside sources, such as legislative history.”290 There are also 
clear statement rules, which imply that drafters use what Gluck and 
Bressman call ‘magic words’ to achieve an interpretation that may 
contradict a constitutional default rule, citing as an example the rule 
                                                          
284 BALDWIN, supra note 22, at 1; see also Lin, supra note 17, at 711 (“FLPMA’s 
sweeping changes, however, did not affect the President’s withdrawal authority 
under the Antiquities Act.”). 
285 Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the 
Inside-an Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: 
Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 961 (2013) (quoting former Justice Antonin Scalia). 
286 Id. at 924.  
287 Id. at 1019 (“The canons provide at least a veneer of legitimacy by allowing 
judges to point to something other than their own personal preferences or intuitions 
to justify their decisions. At the same time, the legitimacy of the canons themselves 
is a cause for discomfort. Judges, and even scholars, seem reluctant to discuss more 
frankly where the canons come from and whether at least some are necessarily 
judicial creations rather than reflections of legislative intent or practice.”). 
288 Id. at 925; see also id. at 961 (such canons derive their most powerful 
justification from ‘rule of law’ norms-the idea that interpretive rules should 
coordinate systemic behavior or impose coherence on the corpus juris.”). 
289 Id. at 924. 
290 Id. at 924-25.  
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requiring “‘unmistakably clear’ language that Congress intends to 
abrogate the states’ immunity from suits before a statute will be so 
construed.”291 Then there is the major questions doctrine, which 
“supports a presumption of nondelegation in the face of statutory 
ambiguity over major policy questions or questions of major political or 
economic significance on the theory, as Justice Scalia has memorably 
described it, that Congress ‘does not . . . hide elephants in mouse 
holes’”292 And finally the “constitutional avoidance” rule, favoring an 
interpretation of a statute that comports with the Constitution.293 
The only textual canon of any possible relevance with respect to the 
meaning of section 431 of the Antiquities Act is expressio unius 
(presence of one term in the statutory text implies a deliberate exclusion 
of any other terms).294 This canon “instructs that when a legal instrument 
grants a power and specifies the mode of its implementation, interpreters 
should treat the specified mode as exclusive.”295 The rule is 
commonsensical—”a lawmaker would not take pains to prescribe 
particular means of carrying out a power if other methods would do.”296 
Thus, when Congress specifically gave affirmative authority to the 
President under the Antiquities Act to protect structures and objects of 
historical and scientific interest and withdraw associated land for their 
                                                          
291 Id. at 942. “In addition there are ‘nearly a dozen’ administrative law canons. The 
spectrum extends from Chevron, which presumes that Congress intends to delegate 
interpretive authority to an agency whenever it leaves an ambiguity in a statute that 
the agency implements; to Mead, which presumes that Congress does not intend to 
delegate interpretive authority without the authorization of relatively formal 
procedures (such as notice-and-comment rulemaking); to the ‘major questions’ 
doctrine, which presumes that Congress does not intend to delegate interpretive 
authority over major policy questions to an agency, even if it leaves a statutory 
ambiguity.” Id. at 990. 
292 Id. at 1003. 
293 Dawn E. Johnsen, What’s a President to Do? Interpreting the Constitution in 
the Wake of Bush Administration Abuses, 88 B.U. L. REV. 395, 406 (2008) 
(commenting on President Bush’s use of that canon and saying “President Bush's 
objections typically took the form of a declaration that he would use the canon of 
statutory construction known as constitutional avoidance to interpret the statute in a 
constitutional manner—but that ‘[a]s a practical matter, this form of interpretation 
amounts to the same thing as an assertion that the President will not enforce or be 
bound by a particular provision of law.’”). 
294 Gluck & Bressman, supra note 285, at 924.  
295 Jack Goldsmith & John Manning, The Protean Take Care Clause, 164 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1835, 1859 (2016). 
296 Id. 
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management, but withheld any power to do more, like revoke a 
previously designated monument or change its boundaries, courts and 
Presidents should treat that authority as exclusive. 
None of the other textual, substantive, or extrinsic canons supports a 
contrary interpretation of the President’s limited authority under the 
Anquities Act are of any help. There is no list of terms in section 431 to 
which noscitur a sociis could apply, what legislative history there is 
supports a sharply curtailed grant of authority to the President to 
designate and protect monuments, not to rescind or amend prior 
designation, and neither the clear statement rule nor major questions 
doctrines is relevant, as no abrogation of power or diminution in state 
authority is involved in withdrawing and protecting land that already 
belongs to the federal government. Nor are there major policy questions 
or questions of major political or economic import involved in a 
designation of a national monument as the effects, to the extent they are 
negative, are highly localized. 
Indeed, no canon of statutory interpretation or interpretive rule or 
doctrine can read into the text of the Antiquities Act a presidential 
authority to rescind or modify a previously declared national monument 
because there is no textual ambiguity on that issue.297 Even if there was 
ambiguity, there are no external signals, such as longstanding 
interpretations of the statutory language, legislative history directives, 
and “linguistic signaling,” which would reveal a congressional intent to 
delegate this authority to the President.298 Quite the contrary, the 
designation of 157 monuments by sixteen Presidents of both political 
parties, as well as affirming judicial opinions and congressional action, 
make it clear that the President possesses only delegated authority to 
designate and protect monuments, not to rescind or amend their 
designation. And any question raised in the legislative history of section 
431 about a presidential power to revoke or modify a previously 
designated national monument was firmly laid to rest in section 204(j) of 
FLPMA, which, as discussed previously, strongly implies Congress 
reserved that authority to itself and not the President.299 Any 
                                                          
297 But see Gluck & Bressman, supra note 285, at 1013 (referring to court review 
under the Chevron doctrine and saying,“[c]ourts currently consider the relative 
clarity of the text at Step One, but our findings indicate that textual clarity is not 
always a reliable signal of delegation. As an initial matter, courts often look to 
textual and substantive canons as indications of congressional intent in deciding 
whether statutory text is clear.”). 
298 Id.  
299 See above, Part IV.A.  
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interpretation of section 431 to the contrary would countenance “a 
usurpation of congressional powers by the Executive Branch,”300 as 
discussed in Part V.A. 
An additional limit on executive discretion are so-called unwritten, 
but nonetheless “obligatory rules of the political game.”301 Vermeule 
divides politics into “two critically different subcategories: ordinary 
contingent politics and moralized politics, in which there are widely 
shared unwritten rules of the political game.”302 With regard to the 
second category, moralized politics, rules regarding them “are founded 
on a sense of obligation, and a public act violating the rules provokes 
retaliatory sanctions or moralized outrage.”303  
Thus, it is conceivable that if President Trump changed the rules of 
the game and exercised a power he does not have, like revoking the prior 
designation of a national monument or shrinking its boundaries, he 
might enrage supporters of that monument who, feeling morally 
wronged, might seek retaliatory sanctions against the President in court 
or in Congress. The resultant political backlash or public anger of the 
people most affected when a convention is transgressed may occur even 
if the underlying law is not violated,304 which it clearly would be in this 
                                                          
300 Arnold & Porter, supra note 12, at 2; see also Rasband, supra note 191, at 629-
30 (“there is no question of Congress' power to revoke or modify a national 
monument designation. Congress has plenary power over the public lands under the 
Property Clause and Congress has abolished a number of monuments in the past, 
although typically only to include the monument lands within a national park 
instead.”). 
301 Vermeule, supra note 190, at 1949. 
302 Id. at 1955-56. 
303 Id.; see also id. at 1956 (“[C]onventions may, but need not, be based upon the 
force of ‘public opinion.’”). “Wayne Aspinall of Colorado, the powerful chair of 
the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, that Aspinall blocked funding 
for the C&O Canal National Monument for many years. Aspinall's action, like the 
action of an earlier Congress with respect to the Jackson Hole National Monument, 
served as a continuing warning to future presidents that national monument 
proclamations under the Antiquities Act carried risks. A President might be able to 
preserve the status quo on public lands through a monument proclamation, but he 
might be denied the money that was needed to protect the monument's resources.” 
Squillace, supra note 25, at 500. 
304 Vermeule, supra note 190, at 1959 (“There exists a category of executive 
discretion such that the Executive may do things without violating any law or 
convention, but will violate a convention, triggering political backlash or public 
outrage, if the Executive makes explicit that he or she is doing those things. Some 
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case, making the reaction still more justified. “Politicians believe—with 
good reason—that the American public cares about the law and will 
punish a President who flouts it.”305 This is especially true when the 
result of a President’s actions is not perceived as good306 or the 
President’s actions are driven by political motives,307 as arguably might 
be the case here as the President seeks to shore up his political base in 
the Intermountain West.308  
Even if a limited right of Presidents to act on their own without 
congressional support was viewed as legitimate, for example when 
Congress does not act to protect some resource or object that is 
threatened with irreversible harm, a President may hesitate to act out of 
concern about public anger, “just as he hesitates before exercising his 
acknowledged right to veto a piece of legislation.”309 Thus, the 
possibility of public anger and/or “political repercussions” operates as “a 
plausible mechanism for assuring that self-help stays within tolerable 
bounds.”310 But under the Antiquities Act, Congress has specifically 
authorized the President to take unitary action to protect threatened 
resources. So no hesitation is warranted as no boundary between the two 
                                                                                                                                       
things may be done, but may not be talked about. Making things explicit may be a 
separate violation.”). 
305 Id. at 1960 n.61 (quoting Nicholas Bagley, Legal Limits and the Implementation 
of the Affordable Care Act, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1715, 1748-49 (2016); see also Cary 
Coglianese & Kirstin Firth, Separation of Powers Legitimacy: An empirical Inquiry 
into Norms About Executive Power, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1869, 1909 (2016) (“With 
the addition of our research findings, judges and scholars now have empirical 
evidence indicating that, in addition to traditional legal and interpretive issues, 
something else appears to be at stake in the debate over norms of executive power: 
public perceptions of the legitimacy of law.”). 
306 Coglianese & Firth, supra note 305, at 1900 (“Furthermore, individuals are 
discriminating when it comes to allocating credit and blame. They are generally 
more willing to assign blame to the President when there are poor outcomes than 
they are to give him credit when things go well.”). 
307 Id. (“Our decision to focus on less contentious issues is reinforced by other 
empirical research demonstrating that politicization of legal actors and institutions 
significantly weakens public legitimacy in these institutions.”). 
308 Political motivations might be attributed to President Clinton’s last minute 
decision to designate Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument timed to help 
with Vice President Gore’s presidential election campaign. See Lin, supra note 17, 
at 736-37 (commenting on the timing of President Clinton’s national monument 
proclamations).  
309 Nicholas Bagley, Legal Limits and the Implementation of the Affordable Care 
Act, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1715, 1748-49 (2016). 
310 Id. 
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branches has been transgressed; nor would public anger, like that 
currently directed at President Obama’s designation of Bears Ears 
National Monument, be justified. On the other hand, should a sitting 
President act to revoke or change a prior President’s designation without 
the legal authority to do that, the public might perceive this as flouting 
the law and be angry.311  
Congress is the best prevention against a President’s abuse of the 
their power under the Antiquities Act to designate a national monument. 
Congress, at any time, can overturn a presidential designation of a 
national monument, change its boundaries, or amend the management 
provisions set out in the designation proclamation.312 Indeed, Congress 
can repeal the Antiquities Act or restrict the exercise of presidential 
discretion under it.313 “In the end, ‘[c]ongressional correction remains 
the most potent check on excesses under the Antiquities Act.’”314 Yet, 
Congress has rarely seen fit to do this, implying some acquiescence in 
how its law is being implemented.315 
                                                          
311 See e.g. Scott Streater, Voters want Trump to protect land, keep monuments, E & 
E NEWS 1 (June 28, 2017), 
http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060056738/print (reporting on a 
Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Partnership commissioned poll that found 83% 
of the respondents supported keeping both the number and size of existing national 
monuments created by Presidents over the past 30 years); see also Letter from 
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, State of New Mexico, to Secretary Ryan 
Zinke (May 18, 2017) (copy in possession of the author) (writing in opposition to 
“any attempt to undo or diminish National Monuments in New Mexico,” reminding 
the Secretary that limitations in the Antiquities Act of undoing prior designations 
“remain the law of the land,” and stating that he fully expected the Secretary’s 
review and recommendations to “stay within the bounds of the law.”); Letter from 
Bob Ferguson, Attorney General of Washington to Secretary Ryan Zinke (May 11, 
2017) (copy in possession of author) (threatening litigation if President Trump 
“seeks to do harm to Washington’s National Monuments by eliminating or 
reducing them”).  
312 Iraola, supra note 3, at 188-89. 
313 Id. Iraola speculates that Congress may need a supermajority to do this. Id. at 
189 n.139. 
314 David H. Getches, Managing the Public Lands: The Authority of the Executive 
to Withdraw Lands, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 279, 306 (1982). 
315 Lin, supra note 17, at 729 (saying that the times Congress has done this shows 
that “these checks and balances are actual and not merely theoretical.”); see also 
Arnold & Porter, supra note 12, at 5 n.16 (“Congress has abolished a number of 
National Monuments by legislation. See, e.g., Wheeler National Monument in 1950 
(64 Stat. 405); Shoshone Cavern in 1954 (68 Stat. 98); Papago Saguaro in 1930 (46 
Stat. 142); Old Kasaan in 1955 (69 Stat. 380); Fossil Cyad in 1956 (70 Stat. 898); 
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C. The President Lacks Implied Power to Revoke or Modify a Previously 
Designated National Monument 
Since statutory text does not directly support presidential revocation 
or modification of a prior monument designation and canons offer no 
interpretive gloss that can change unambiguous text, a question remains 
whether that power can be implied from the language of the Act or from 
an inherent power the President has over the nation’s public lands.316 
The answer to that question is also no.  
Although Presidents reduced or eliminated Indian reservations 
unilaterally by executive order until Congress acted to prohibit those 
actions,317 “the executive power to create the reservation had also been 
implied . . . from long congressional silence and acquiescence to prior 
executive order Indian reservations.”318 The President’s power to create 
a national monument is textually supported in the Antiquities Act and 
not a matter of implication. It would seem logical, “therefore, that a 
court would be much more reluctant to find implied authority to revoke 
a proclamation issued pursuant to a specific congressional directive,” as 
opposed to an implied authorization to do so when the initial grant of 
power was implied as well.319  
Further, several laws enacted in the same era as the Antiquities Act 
authorizing the President to withdraw public lands also specifically 
delegated to the Present or the Secretary of the Interior Department the 
                                                                                                                                       
Castle Pinkney in 1956 (70 Stat 61); Father Millet Cross in 1949 (63 Stat. 691); 
Holy Cross in 1950 (64 Stat. 404); Verendrye in 1956 (70 Stat. 730), and Santa 
Rosa Island in 1946 (60 Stat. 712).” 
316 Rasband, supra note 191, at 625 (“Because there is no express delegation, a 
president would need to prove that a power to revoke can be implied from the 
language of the act or can be derived from some inherent executive authority over 
the public lands.”); Arnold & Porter, supra note 12, at 6 (“For the President to have 
the power to revoke a Monument designation under the Antiquities Act, therefore, 
the issue is whether that Act, not the Constitution’s grant of the executive power to 
the President, may be interpreted to imply the unstated power to revoke a 
Monument designation thereunder.”). Rasband adds “[i]ndeed, if a court were to 
read into the Antiquities Act presidential power to revoke a proclamation, it might 
prove a pyrrhic victory for those who support revocation because it would suggest 
that the president has some inherent power to withdraw public lands in the future.” 
Rasband, supra note 191, at 627. 
317 Id. at 625. 
318 Id. at 625-26. 
319 Id. at 626. 
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power to revoke a prior withdrawal.320 These provisions would have 
been “surplusage” in those laws had Congress understood that the power 
to revoke a withdrawal could be implied from the authority to make a 
withdrawal or was an inherent power of the President.321  
The Attorney General of the United States, in an oft-cited 1938 
opinion, characterized as “improper” implying a presidential power to 
revoke or amend a prior designation of a national monument from the 
text of the Antiquities Act.322 In response to a request by President 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt to rescind a national monument designation 
by President Coolidge, Attorney General Cummings wrote:  
 
A duty properly performed by the Executive under statutory authority 
has the validity and sanctity which belong to the statute itself, and, 
unless it be within the terms of the power conferred by that statute, the 
Executive can no more destroy his own authorized work, without some 
other legislative sanction, than any other person can. To assert such a 
principle is to claim for the Executive the power to repeal or alter an 
act of Congress at will.323  
 
The Cummings Opinion commented that since there was no separate 
statutory authority for the President to terminate a monument that a prior 
President had designated, any authority to do this must be implied by the 
other powers given the President in the Antiquities Act. Attorney 
General Cummings reasoned that since the President had no inherent 
authority over public lands, when he did anything affecting those lands, 
he was acting only with delegated authority from Congress. This made 
the designation of a monument equivalent to an act of Congress, leaving 
                                                          
320 Id. (citing the Pickett Act, 36 Stat. 847 (1901) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 141) 
(repealed by Pub. L. No. 94-569, § 704(a) (1976)), (“giving Presidents authority to 
“temporarily withdraw public lands”). 
321 Rasband, supra note 191, at 627. Similarly, if Congress has delegated the 
authority to excise or suspend some provision of a law, it “would be conceptually 
redundant if that authority already existed under the aegis of ‘inherent’ executive 
power.” Andrew Dudley, Open Borders: Congressional Delegation of 
Discretionary Authority to Suspend or Repeal the Laws of the United States. 41 
ARIZ. ST. L. J. 273, 281, 284 (2009). 
322 Arnold & Porter, supra note 12, at 1. 
323 39 Op. Atty Gen. 185, 185 (1938) (the Cummings Opinion); see also Arnold & 
Porter, supra note 12, at 5 (quoting Proposed Abolishment of Castle Pinckney Nat’l 
Monument, 39 Op. Atty. Gen. 185, 185 (1938), citing Opinion by Attorney General 
Edward Bates to the Secretary of the Interior, 10 Op. Atty. Gen. 359 (1862)) (in 
possession of author). 
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the President without independent power to rescind a previously 
designated monument.324 The opinion cited prior Attorney General 
Opinions in support.325  
 The fact that Presidents have occasionally changed or revoked 
executive orders implementing some public land action could militate in 
favor of granting the President the power to modify a previously 
designated national monument.326 However, the same reasoning that 
argues against allowing a President to revoke a previously designated 
national monument applies when the President tries to modify that 
earlier designation–namely, that when “a President issues a 
proclamation on matters either within the President’s inherent powers or 
delegated authority, the proclamation has the force of law,”327 as the 
Cummings Opinion states.  
Rasband disagrees and finds that presidential modifications that 
reduce a previously designated monument’s size to conform to the 
management needs of the protected objects should be allowable. He 
cites in support Attorney General Cumming’s 1938 Opinion that 
identifies this as an open question.328 He also relies on a 1947 
Department of Interior Decision stating that language in the Antiquities 
Act that a monument’s size be limited to “the smallest area compatible 
with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected” 
may authorize such action.329 Rasband points to the separation in the Act 
of the President’s power to designate structures from the power to 
reserve lands necessary to protect them, opining that courts might use 
that separation to justify allowing the President to shrink the size of a 
                                                          
324 BALDWIN, supra note 22, at 1 n.10; see also Squillace, supra note 25, at 522 
(commenting on President Hoover’s Attorney General’s Opinion saying that 
transferring jurisdiction over national monuments to the NPS from the Departments 
of War and Agriculture was beyond the President’s authority because “Congress 
intended that jurisdiction to administer the national monuments which the President 
was . . . authorized to create should reside in the Departments which had 
jurisdiction respectively of the land within which the monuments were located,” 
and explaining that opinion as indicative of the President’s limited delegation under 
the Antiquities Act, which did not allow him to transfer jurisdiction over federal 
lands). 
325 BALDWIN, supra note 22, at 1 (noting that the Cummings Opinion cited with 
approval 10 Op. Atty. Gen. 359, 364 (1862) (an opinion cited with approval in 17 
Op. Atty. Gen. 168 (1881) and 36 Op. Atty. Gen. 75, 79 (1929)). 
326 BALDWIN, supra note 22, at 1. 
327 Id. 
328 Rasband, supra note 191, at 627. 
329 Id.  
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monument that is considered inconsistent with that language.330  
Asserting that since the only support for large withdrawals from 
President Teddy Roosevelt to the present is “congressional 
acquiescence,” Rasband reasons that shrinking the size of a previously 
designated monument “would thus be akin to modifying a withdrawal 
based on implied executive authority rather than on a specific act of 
Congress.”331 But, Rasband cites no support for implied executive 
authority. While Squillace concedes that a proclamation might need to 
be modified “to correct a mistake or clarify a legal description in the 
original proclamation,”332 FLPMA, enacted thirty-eight years after the 
Cummings Opinion, “cements” the prohibition against a President 
“revisit[ing] a predecessor’s decision about how much public land 
should be protected,”333 eliminating any textual ambiguity on the 
question. 
Congress, in essence, adopted the conclusion of Attorney General 
Cummings’ Opinion that only Congress had the authority to revoke the 
designation of a National Monument in section 204(j) when it enacted 
FLPMA in 1976,334 giving it the force of law.335 When it enacted section 
207(j) of FLPMA forbidding a President from modifying a prior 
designation, Congress eliminated any ambiguity in the Cummings 
Opinion over whether the President could shrink or otherwise change the 
boundaries of a designated monument to conform to the statutory 
mandate that only the “smallest acreage” be reserved to properly manage 
and protect designated objects.336  
Thus, there is no basis in the text of the Antiquities Act for granting 
President Trump the direct or implied power to rescind or modify the 
boundaries of the Bears Ears National Monument. No statutory canons 
or other interpretive guidance can contradict that text or the later action 
by Congress and prior administrations reifying it. 
V. GRANTING THE PRESIDENT THE AUTHORITY TO AFFECT A PREVIOUSLY 
                                                          
330 Id. at 627-28. 
331 Id. at 628. 
332 Squillace et al., supra note 5, at 69 (citing the issuance of two proclamations by 
President Taft to clarify an ambiguous initial description of the Navajo Mountain 
National Monument in the initial proclamation). 
333 Id. 
334 Arnold & Porter, supra note 12, at 1. 
335 Id. at 6. 
336 BALDWIN, supra note 22, at 1 (noting that Presidents have done this). 
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DESIGNATED NATIONAL MONUMENT VIOLATES THE SEPARATION OF 
POWERS DOCTRINE AND WELL-ESTABLISHED NORMS OF DELEGATED 
POWER 
No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped 
with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty than that on 
which the objection is founded. The accumulation of all powers, 
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of 
one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or 
elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny. 
Were the federal Constitution, therefore, really chargeable with the 
accumulation of power, or with a mixture of powers, having a 
dangerous tendency to such an accumulation, no further arguments 
would be necessary to inspire a universal reprobation of the system.337  
 
By assuming a power that only Congress has, a President who 
revokes or amends a prior designation of a national monument violates 
the separation of powers doctrine. Unless a power is specifically 
delegated to a President or can be implied from the Act’s text or the 
President’s general powers, a President cannot usurp a congressional 
prerogative. The prior Part showed the President has no such power 
either by direct or implied congressional delegation.  
Nor can the President waive statutory text that would otherwise 
apply to him because he finds it limiting or inconvenient. The 
President’s constitutional duty to take care that the laws are faithfully 
executed prevent him from ignoring unambiguous language in the 
Antiquities Act limiting his authority to the identification and protection 
of national monuments.  
A.  Violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine 
The doctrine of separation of powers is not explicitly mentioned in 
the Constitution.338 The concept does not “have the status of an 
enforceable legal norm,” nor is it “a freestanding principle” that can be 
implied from the Constitution’s overall structure.339 However, 
“separation of powers, like democracy and the rule of law, may be an 
indispensable part of our theory of politics (in America) or our 
American constitutionalism, even if it is not, in the legalistic sense, a 
                                                          
337 THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 313 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
338 Vermeule, supra note 85, at 688. 
339 Id. 
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freestanding principle of our Constitution.”340 
Presidents must “respect the constitutional functions of the other 
branches of government. . . .[and] must not impermissibly infringe upon 
the Supreme Court’s judicial power or Congress’s legislative power.”341 
They display “constitutional arrogance” when they use their “unilateral 
powers to break boundaries and displace other constitutional 
authorities.”342 Gerhardt points to what he calls the “inherent tendency” 
of Presidents to “aggrandize” their power making the Executive Branch 
the one “most prone to ‘constitutional arrogance.’”343 Any new claim of 
executive power “lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of 
any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent 
need.”344 Claims that President Obama’s designation of the Bears Ears 
National Monument will cause economic hardship, trampled on the 
constitutional rights of Utah, and represents an abuse of executive 
authority have the ring of an urgent need for action–here revocation of 
that designation. However, as prior parts of this article have shown, none 
of these claims is valid and so no urgency exists.  
Underlying the concept of separation of powers is respect for “the 
character and distinctiveness of each of the three main functions of 
government”345—legislative, executive, and judicial. “[F]unctionally 
separated decisionmaking” has “intrinsic or inherent value from the 
standpoint of political morality.”346 The result is that the separation of 
powers doctrine has risen to a “canonical” level in our “tradition of 
                                                          
340 Jeremy Waldron, Separation of Powers in Thought and Practice, 54 B.C. L. 
REV. 433, 436 (2013); see also id. at 435 (“[W]hatever it says in the constitution, 
does the best interpretation of the constitution's provisions require us to embrace 
this as a background legal principle”); Vermeule, supra note 85, at 688 (“But 
Waldron rightly observes that even if the separation of powers lacks legal force, it 
may still have force as a principle of our constitutional culture—a political ideal in 
the high constitutional sense.”). 
341 Johnsen, supra note 293, at 413. 
342 Coglianese & Yoo, supra note 162, at 1601 n.57 (quoting Michael J. Gerhardt, 
Constitutional Arrogance, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1651 (2016)). 
343 Id. at 1651. 
344 Johnsen, supra note 293, at 397-98 n.11 (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 
323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J. dissenting)). 
345 Vermeule, supra note 85, at 688; see also id. at 688-89 (“Rather than collapse 
all official decisionmaking into an undifferentiated mass, as in the dictates of a 
khadi or monarch, it is desirable that there should be ‘articulated government 
through successive phases of governance each of which maintains its own 
integrity.’”). 
346 Id. at 689. 
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political thought.”347 Although the Court has not constructed “rigid 
barriers” separating the three branches of government, it has “sought to 
guard against direct acts of ‘encroachment or aggrandizement’ that 
would shift the balance of power between the branches and thereby 
weaken structural checks among them.’”348 By proposing to exercise a 
power that Congress reserved to itself the power to rescind or modify a 
monument designation, the President will impermissibly “encroach” on 
the powers of the Legislative Branch and thus violate the separation of 
powers doctrine.  
B.  Abuse of the Norms Governing Delegated Power 
The basis for Congress’ authority to enact the Antiquities Act 
resides in the Property Clause of the Constitution authorizing Congress 
“to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the 
Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.”349 A 
President who designates a national monument under the Antiquities Act 
is acting pursuant to congressionally delegated powers; “he is not 
exercising authority vested in the executive branch.”350 Accordingly, 
whether a President may revoke or change a prior designation depends 
on whether Congress intended the President to have that power. 
However, as discussed previously, the Act does not delegate to the 
President the direct or implied power to do this.  
 
On its face, the Antiquities Act does not appear to be a two-way 
delegation. It expressly delegates to the president authority to ‘declare’ 
a national monument and to ‘reserve’ the land necessary to care for 
and manage that monument, but says nothing about a president’s 
authority to revoke an existing monument.351  
 
The Take Care Clause of the Constitution352 and Article II, Section 
                                                          
347 Waldron, supra note 340, at 437.  
348 Dudley, supra note 321, at 281, 290. 
349 U.S. CONST. art IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
350 Rasband, supra note 191, at 625. 
351 Id.; see also Arnold & Porter, supra note 12 (referring to national monuments 
which have been brought into the National Park system and saying, “[r]evoking the 
designation of such a National Monument and pulling it out of the National Park 
system would certainly be in derogation of the reasons such special places were 
added to that system.”). 
352 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
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1, together with Section 2, Clause 8353 requires the President to assure 
the faithful execution of the laws of the United States.354 The Antiquities 
Act is a law of the United States. The “Court has treated the Take Care 
Clause as the direct constitutional source of the President’s obligation to 
respect legislative supremacy”355 and as “the textual source of the 
President’s duty to abide by and enforce the laws enacted by Congress-
that is, as the instantiation of the President’s duty to respect legislative 
supremacy and not to act contra legem.”356 Despite “the inherently 
imprecise nature of the Take Care Clause obligation,”357 the Court has 
interpreted the Clause as though it had “firm and definite content,” 
including the maxim of legislative supremacy.358 
Suspending or repealing a provision of a statute is “legislative in 
character.”359 A President simply does not possess inherent discretionary 
                                                          
353 U.S. CONST. art. II, §1, cl. 8 
354 Johnsen, supra note 293, at 408 (“The President's constitutionally prescribed 
oath of office, the Take Care Clause, and the Supremacy Clause confirm the 
President's obligation to uphold the Constitution through all executive action.”); see 
also Coglianese & Yoo, supra note 162, at 1599 (“Bellia notes that the Take Care 
Clause cuts both ways in terms of discretion, recognizing that Presidents possess 
discretion in how the law is enforced, while simultaneously obligating them to 
execute the law in a faithful manner.”). 
355 Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 295, at 1837. While Coglianese and Yoo 
found it “not very surprising” that the Court agreed to review a lower court’s 
injunction blocking implementation of the Obama Administration's immigration 
policy, they found it “telling that the Court, on its own accord, added to the 
questions raised by the parties a constitutional question involving the duty of a 
President to take care that federal laws are faithfully executed.” Coglianese & Yoo, 
supra note 162, at 1591 (referring to the Supreme Court’s decision in United States 
v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 906, 906 (2016), and saying that “the Take Care Clause has 
been like the Court's own Key Number for freestanding separation-of-powers 
principles.”). 
356 Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 295, at 1849; see also id. at 1851 (“[T]he 
Court has read the Take Care Clause to limit the President's authority to act contra 
legem”); id. at 1850 (“Justice Jackson wrote that the clause confers on the President 
‘a governmental authority that reaches so far as there is law,’ thereby 
‘signify[ing] . . . that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and that we submit 
ourselves to rulers only if under rules.”).  
357 Id. at 1866. 
358 Id. at 1867 (“The Take Care Clause underwrites the President's removal power, 
draws a line between judicial and executive power, offers a source for the 
President's exercise of prosecutorial discretion, establishes legislative supremacy, 
and gives the President a measure of completion power.”). 
359 Dudley, supra note 321, at 278. 
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authority to excise the laws of the United States, even though Presidents 
possess prosecutorial discretion, have inherent foreign policy powers, 
and can proceed without congressional approval in certain situations.360 
It is a “simple intuition that once Congress has legislated with 
specificity, it has made its policy preference clear and demonstrated its 
capacity to make policy in that area.”361 If the President was allowed to 
waive the language in FLPMA preventing him from affecting in any 
way a designation of a national monument by a prior President, he 
would be “dispensing with” a duly enacted law of Congress.362 This 
means that the President cannot view a decision to rescind or modify a 
prior designation of a national monument like an “administrative 
waiver” of language in FLPMA that specifically prevents him from 
doing this or language in the Antiquities Act that only gives him limited 
authority to identify and protect historic structures and objects of 
scientific interest. 
According to Goldsmith and Manning, “any authority conferred by 
the Take Care Clause ‘starts and ends with the laws Congress has 
enacted.’”363 The Court considers that the Clause deprives the President 
of any power to create exceptions or exemptions from a legislative 
directive—what Goldsmith and Manning call “dispensation powers.364 It 
is rare that a presidential refusal to enforce a statute is justifiable;365 
indeed Johnsen suggests that such an action by a President would be 
“highly suspect.”366  
Allowing a President to waive a statutory obligation is comparable 
to the President refusing to enforce the law. For this reason, Presidents 
                                                          
360 Id. at 281, 284. 
361 David J. Barron & Todd Rukoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 
265, 317 (2013); see also id. at 333 (“[I]t makes sense presumptively to view the 
congressionally stipulated rule as primary, which is to say, as governing unless the 
waiver can be shown to be superior. Moreover, according this presumption creates 
a positive dynamic of accountability when fed back into the legislative 
process . . .”). 
362 Id. at 340. 
363 Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 295, at 1850 (quoting Justice Douglas, 
concurring in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 633 
(1952)). 
364 Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 295, at 1850. 
365 Johnsen, supra note 293, at 411 (“To identify those rare cases in which 
nonenforcement is justified requires ‘the President to make sometimes difficult 
evaluations that depend on the specific statutory provision and the circumstances 
surrounding its enactment.’”). 
366 Id. at 413. 
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cannot waive a statutory requirement unless they have explicit authority 
to do that.367 There is no authority in FLPMA section 204(j) to waive 
section 213 of the Antiquities Act—in fact, quite the opposite, the 
provision enjoins doing this. Thus, allowing a President to rescind the 
designation of a monument by a prior President would only be possible 
if the President ignored language in section 204(j) of FLPMA 
prohibiting him from doing this. Such an action would amount to a 
“veto” of section 204 and would “obliterate”368 the designation process 
in the Antiquities Act by making something that is intended to be 
permanent, a national monument, impermanent.  
Nor can a change in Administration or in “political complexion” 
serve as a justification for waiving a statutory requirement.369 
Justification of a waiver of a statute’s substantive provisions, what 
Barron and Rukoff refer to as “big waivers, may be justifiable if the 
waiver carries forward what might “reasonably be thought to be one or 
more purposes of the statute”370 or at least the purpose of the provision 
being waived.371 Except for reconfiguring the boundaries of a monument 
                                                          
367 Barron & Rukoff, supra note 361, at 312; see also id. at 335 (“To begin, to 
waive any, or at least major, substantive statutory provisions, there has to be 
explicit statutory authority. And the scope of the waiver authority should be 
specific-specific, at least, relative to the statute itself.”). 
368 Id. at 312-13. Barron and Rukoff use the terms “administrative veto” and 
“obliterate in their discussion of “big waivers,” statutorily authorized waivers of a 
law’s provisions that amount to an “administrative veto” of the heart of that 
statutory framework, “provisions that seem most central to its effective operation as 
a regulatory mechanism.” They distinguish big waivers from the power to 
“modify” or “tinker” with a law by excising certain requirements in the law in 
response to a situation the law did not contemplate. Id. at 277. If President Trump 
proceeded to de-designate Bears Ears that would amount to a big waiver of sections 
213 of the Antiquities Act and 204(j) of FLPMA and would be way beyond 
“tinkering” with those provisions. 
369 Id. at 331 (“It is not a sufficient justification for the exercise of big waiver that 
the administration has a different political complexion from Congress or that a new 
administration with different political views has been elected. Even in the rule-for-
rule substitution case, the proposition that a new administration, for that reason 
alone, is justified in changing the rules has never had more than fitful support in the 
Supreme Court.”); see also id. at 232 (“The assumption that the initial conditions 
Congress established were intended to be stickier than a mere agency rule seems 
appropriate.”). 
370 Id. at 332. 
371 Id. at 335 (“[S]tatute should provide, or, if silent, should be understood to 
provide, for big waiver only insofar as it is in furtherance of the same basic 
purposes as the substantive statutory provisions to be waived. If the waiver 
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to conform to preservation needs or to correct some error in the 
designation, it is difficult to point to any other modification let alone 
rescission of a prior monument designation that would be considered as 
carrying forward the Antiquities Act’s purposes. It would also be 
difficult for President Trump to show that a change in circumstances, 
other than a change in Administration, since Bears Ears was originally 
designated six months ago, justifies its rescission or modification given 
that the factor’s justifying the monument’s designation should still be in 
existence if the area has been properly preserved.372 
Further, a President has no discretion whether to implement a law 
which “assigns specific duties” to him.373 Conformance with a non-
discretionary legal requirement, here the process for designating a 
national monument, “is a ministerial duty of the Executive Branch.”374 
Allowing a President to suspend or repeal enacted laws, be it section 431 
of the Antiquities Act or section 207(j) of FLPMA, enables that 
President “to eliminate popularly-passed laws outside the delegating 
statute without the operation of an authorized legislative process.”375 
The fact that a President can act in derogation of a law more quickly 
than Congress can correct or amend it “poses an additional threat to the 
social contract,” by curtailing the time the public or its elected 
representatives have “to identify and to correct the wrongful actions of a 
rogue agent”—here the President—“as well as reducing the time 
available for fact-finding, deliberation, and debate.”376  
Among problems with allowing Presidents to amend or suspend 
existing laws is that Congress might have considered the suspended 
provision to be consistent with the statute’s objectives or might be a 
provision that Congress would preserve, if given a choice.377 Giving 
Presidents the power “to suspend or repeal laws passed by previous 
                                                                                                                                       
authority is meant to serve some additional or different purpose, it should explicitly 
so state.”). 
372 Barron & Rukoff, supra note 361, at 332 (“It may be helpful in understanding 
what the agency is doing for it to show how the world differs from the world that 
existed, or was imagined, at the enactment of the statute.”). 
373 Dudley, supra note 321, at 284-85. 
374 Id.; see also id. at 285 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 141, 166 (1803) 
(“Conformance with the law itself, however, is not within the inherent discretion of 
the Executive Branch.”)). 
375 Id. at 289 
376 Id. 
377 Id. at 291-92. 
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Congresses”378 also creates an indirect separation of powers problem. 
This problem arises “because it would enable a hypothetical political 
majority in control of both Congress and the Presidency to disassemble 
the enactments of previous governments with exceptional haste, thereby 
removing an intrinsic ‘temporal’ check imposed by the plodding Article 
I process.’”379 At the time of writing this article, this situation is not 
“hypothetical.” 
According to Peter Straus, “the question here is how we should 
prefer the President to imagine his role in a rule-of-law culture—not 
what he can get away with, not what the sanctions are, but what it is that 
his role under the Constitution, well-imagined, calls on him to do.”380 
The President’s obligation under the Take Care Clause is “an expression 
of the President’s unique authority in the allocated functions of 
government.”381 The “root proposition,” again according to Straus, “is 
that the President does, of necessity, have room for his own provisional 
judgments about what the Constitution means, and the power to act on 
those judgments.”382 However, “[w]hen the President takes measures 
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power 
is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional 
powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.”383 
Such a “[p]residential claim to a power at once so conclusive and 
preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the 
equilibrium established by our constitutional system.”384  
                                                          
378 Id. 
379 Id. at 281, 291-92. 
380 Peter Strauss, The President and Choices Not to Enforce, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 107, 110 (2000). 
381 Id. at 112. 
382 Id. at 117. 
383 Id. 
384 Id. at 118 (quoting Justice Jackson, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 
343 U.S. 579, 535-38 (1952); see also Strauss, supra note 380, at 112 (“Congress 
has, on occasion, made such decisions reviewable.” A painful footnote to Heckler 
v. Chaney hints that there might be limits to judicial reluctance to review, leaving 
open for future decision the “situation where it could justifiably be found that the 
agency has ‘consciously and expressly adopted a general policy’ that is so extreme 
as to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities.”). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
“Even drops of water falling upon a rock in long lapse of time hollow 
out that rock.”385 
 
This article has shown that there is no support in the text of the 
Antiquities Act or its legislative or implementation history or in judicial 
opinions for presidential rescission or modification of previously 
designated national monuments. Enactment of section 204(j) in 1976 
affirmed that this power belongs only to Congress. Well-understood 
principles of separation of powers counsel against allowing Presidents to 
assume this authority; while, norms of delegated authority warn against 
allowing Presidents to waive provisions of laws they do not like or 
disagree with, as this would contradict their constitutional duty to assure 
that the laws are faithfully executed. 
Preferences in states like Utah are changing as employment shifts 
from traditional occupations, like ranching, to recreation and tourism. 
Operating under the shadow of a possible de-designation of a national 
monument may destabilize these transitioning local economies, which 
have adjusted positively to their presence. Granting the President this 
power will also create uncertainty with respect to the permanence of 
these monuments, affecting their long term management, and undercut 
the Act’s purposes by lessening the likelihood that any new monuments 
will be designated.  
All these reasons militate against assuming the President has this 
power, making any use of it vulnerable to judicial challenge and 
potential political backlash, if the President is perceived to be behaving 
illegitimately. Questions about the legitimacy of the President’s actions 
can destabilize the Republic to the extent it disrupts the “equilibrium” of 
our constitutional system. Thus, what at first glance appears to be an 
inconsequential act-- the revocation of President Obama’s designation of 
Bears Ears National Monument—upon further reflection gains grave 
importance.  
 
                                                          
385 LUCRETIUS, DE RERUM NATURA, 134 (Martin Ferguson Smith, trans., Hackett 
Publishing Company 1969) (1st century, B.C.). 
